

3 APRIL 1947

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I N D E X
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EXHIBITS

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
887	2404		Affidavit of HIRATA, Yukihiro		19276
885	2405		Affidavit of TAKEDA, Hisashi		19321

Thursday, 3 April 1947

- - -

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
at 0930.

- - -

Appearances:

For the Tribunal, same as before.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

- - -

(English to Japanese and Japanese
to English interpretation was made by the
Language Section, IMTFE.)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
4 except OKAWA, MATSUI and TOGO who are represented
5 by counsel. The prison surgeon at Sugamo certifies
6 that MATSUI and TOGO are unable to attend the trial
7 today because of illness. The certificate will be
8 recorded and filed.

9 Counsel BANNO.

10 MR. BANNO: Before continuing where we left
11 off yesterday, I have one request to make to the Court.
12 The two documents presented yesterday, namely, exhibit
13 2401 and exhibit 2403; the former is the letter
14 left by General HONJO and the second one, the latter,
15 the True Nature of the Manchurian Incident. These
16 two documents were locked up in the safe of the HONJO
17 family.

18 The family -- General HONJO's family was of
19 the opinion that these are precious remnants of the
20 late General HONJO and they should not be made public
21 at all. We made special requests to the family : and
22 presented those two documents because the case re-
23 ferred to is included in the Indictment and it is con-
24 cerned with significant matters.

25 THE MONITOR: Slight correction: We presented

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1 these documents because we believe that these docu-
2 ment have vital bearing on the issue as indicated in
3 the Indictment, and also these documents are material
4 to the issues.

5 MR. BANNO: (Continuing) It is my request
6 for defense counsel that those two documents may be
7 returned -- the original of those two documents
8 may be returned to the family and a copy, if necessary
9 a photographic copy, should be allowed to replace those
10 original ones.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you wish to say?

12 MR. BANNO: Yes, your Honor.

13 THE PRESIDENT: I do not see any urgency about
14 this matter at all. The originals will remain in the
15 custody of the Court until the Court otherwise directs.
16 I will have to consult all the Members of the Court.

17 Proceed to read that last exhibit.

18 - - -

19 K Y O I C H I K A W A M U R A, called as a witness
20 on behalf of the defense, resumed the stand
21 and testified through Japanese interpreters
22 as follows:

23 MR. BANNO: Before proceeding with the read-
24 ing of this exhibit I would like to state that the
25 last paragraph of this document will be omitted because

1 it contains opinion.

2 DIRECT EXAMINATION

3 BY MR. BANNO (Continued):

4 "The True Nature of the Manchurian Incident
5 "Written by HONJO, Shigeru in early October,
6 1945.

7 "Introduction

8 "All the records and materials of my own
9 in regard to the Manchurian Incident were incinerated
10 during the air raids. I am obliged, therefore, in
11 writing these notes, to rely on my memory. More-
12 over, as the Incident happened some fourteen years
13 ago I cannot claim that the dates, places, sequence
14 and other minor points are infallible. I am very sure,
15 however, that there is no mistake in the true nature
16 of the Incident and the quality of my conviction
17 at the time I encountered it.

18 "Chapter I

19 "General Situation Before the Outbreak of
20 the Incident

21 "I was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of
22 the Kwantung Army in August of the 6th year of Showa
23 (1931) when anti-Japanese movements in China which
24 had steadily become aggravated were getting much
25 worse in spite of Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA's (the

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1 present Premier) earnest co-operative policy. This
2 tendency was especially strong in Manchuria, and
3 unhappy incidents occurred day by day. Just before
4 my arrival at the new post, moreover, serious incidents
5 occurred one on top of another and remained unsettled.
6 There were such incidents as the slaughter by the Jun-
7 Ken unit of Captain NAKAMURA and Sergeant-Major ISUGI,
8 who held proper visas, and the ill-treatment of
9 Korean farmers at Wanpao-shan through the joint action
10 of the Manchurian Army, officials and people. I was
11 in great anxiety over such a serious situation in
12 Manchuria.

13 "My anxiety was deepened all the more by my
14 first inspection of the units under my command which
15 was made just after my arrival. There is no doubt
16 that according to the Commercial Lease which was ac-
17 quired during Foreign Minister KOMURA's tenure of
18 office subjects of the Japanese Empire had the right
19 to dwell and trade not only in the areas belonging
20 to the South Manchuria Railway Company and commercial
21 ports but also in the interior. Nevertheless I saw
22 with my own eyes that even those who were engaging
23 in the medical profession, a cultural work, dealing
24 with inhabitants in Manchuria were unable to reside in
25 the above mentioned areas belonging to the south

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1 Manchurian Railway Company and commercial ports which
2 were nothing but points and a line. As the insults
3 and persecutions of Imperial subjects, moreover,
4 spread to these areas, military protection was required
5 even for boys and girls of primary schools on their
6 way to and from school, and in the areas where no
7 troops were stationed schools could not help being
8 closed indefinitely or abolished. Accordingly,
9 Imperial subjects in Manchuria comprising the Japanese
10 and Koreans, who amounted to 1,200,000 or 1,300,000
11 several years before that time, went back to the
12 homeland in succession. Consequently they amounted
13 to less than 1,000,000 at the time when the Incident
14 broke out, and most of them were second generation
15 people who had no professions or homes to go back to.

16 "According to the Imperial government's
17 policy of avoiding friction with the Manchurian side
18 as much as possible our Kwantung army exhausted every
19 means in order to use caution in order to soften the
20 feeling. For instance, our soldiers did not go out
21 from the areas belonging to the South Manchurian
22 Railway Company or commercial ports except when military
23 maneuvers were held, and moreover, even during military
24 maneuvers they did not carry ammunition. Nevertheless,
25 when the Japanese Army held maneuvers the Manchurian
military authorities demanded to be notified in advance

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1 of the place and the date for maneuver ignoring the
2 agreement regarding the right of non-notification.
3 When we announced them in advance complying with this
4 demand, they held maneuvers at the same time and
5 place using our notification to their advantage and
6 making our maneuver difficult or impossible to hold.
7 There were, moreover, even some soldiers who conducted
8 demonstrations and made threats to us taking advantage
9 of our not carrying ammunition, and so they caused
10 further trouble. They even prohibited us at last
11 from holding maneuvers in the places which were not
12 in areas belonging to the South Manchurian Railway
13 Company or the commercial ports, and refused, further-
14 more, our request for the loan or transfer of specified
15 places for maneuvers in place of the prohibited ones.
16 Thus our drill upon which the Army itself depends
17 was practically checked. In the meantime, violence
18 and insults to Imperial subjects and soldiers were
19 intensified everywhere. As these untoward troubles
20 and breaches of the law arose in great numbers every
21 moment was a crisis full of dynamite at the time I
22 arrived at the post.

23 "Chapter 2

24 "Outline of the Incident

25 "On the 18th of September (1931), the month

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1 after my arrival at the post, Manchurian troops who
2 were stationed at Peitaiying in the suburbs of Mukden
3 destroyed with explosives in the neighborhood of
4 Rintiaokou, the South Manchurian Railway tracks which
5 ran through the western border of that camp. Thus
6 the crisis full of dynamite exploded at last.

7 "At that time some of our forces which were
8 practicing railway defense drill at a place not far
9 from the spot hastily went there and drove out the
10 hostile troops who were committing the outrage.
11 At the same time we returned the attack of enemy
12 forces that were covering the retreat of those who
13 had committed the outrage, and with the assistance
14 of units from the rear our army finally succeeded
15 in bottling them up in Peitaiying.

16 "Receiving an urgent dispatch concerning the
17 above, I immediately issued the necessary order to
18 the forces under my command stationed at various
19 points to use force. This was done without having
20 enough time to ask instructions from headquarters.
21 Among forces under my control, however, there were
22 some which started action before the arrival of my
23 orders, and there were some that started attacks
24 previous to the enemy's offensive.

25 "In this way, the Kwantung Army took the

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1 offensive all along the line. Now, why did I arbitrar-
2 ily issue orders to use force to the forces under my
3 control? Why were there some forces which started
4 activities before the arrival of my orders, and why
5 were there some units which started attacks previous
6 to the enemy's offensive?
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1 "It is needless to say that the first duty of
2 the Kwantung Army was to protect the railway belonging
3 to the South Manchuria Railway Company. And this
4 Army was one which, stationed overseas, had also the
5 duties of protecting the residents' lives and property,
6 the interests of its own country and of defending
7 the Army itself. These duties were not inferior to the
8 first duty in importance. According to regulations, the
9 responsibility and right of performing these duties
10 were entrusted to not only me but to all successive
11 commanders-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. The situation
12 at that time, moreover, was so critical that we could
13 not help believing that any new occurrence caused by
14 the Manchurian side as mentioned above suggested Pan-
15 Manchurian planned activity.

16 "What further stirred up trouble was the
17 blowing up of the railway line. As Rintiaokou was
18 located near Peitaiying, Manchurian soldiers in that
19 camp stole along the railway and frequently attempted
20 to overturn trains by placing obstructions on
21 the lines. But this was the first time that they had
22 committed such an action as a blowing up. Japanese
23 residents in Manchuria, decreased in number as they
24 were, amounted to at that time about one million, in-
25 cluding Koreans, and the Imperial interests in Manchuria

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1 at that time really constituted a matter which would
2 seal the fate of the Empire.

3 "The military strength of the Kwantung Army
4 which should protect not only all the lines of the
5 South Manchuria Railway but also the above mentioned
6 interests and had to defend the Army itself was com-
7 posed of one peace-footing division and six indepen-
8 dent defense battalions and numbered only 15,000 or
9 16,000. On the other side the military strength of
10 the Manchurian side numbered as many as 200,000, and
11 so it was evident that not only the South Manchuria
12 Railway but also our army, residents and interests
13 would have been ruined if the army had idly hesitated.
14 This was the reason why I issued to the units under
15 my control orders to use force without asking for in-
16 structions from headquarters with the responsibility
17 and the right which had been naturally given to me.
18 This is why there were some forces which started
19 activities before the arrival of my orders, and why
20 there were some forces which started attacks previous
21 to the enemy's offensive. At the same time, I believe
22 that no matter what country it may belong to this is
23 in keeping with the character of any army called upon
24 to defend itself against a large force with far smaller
25 numbers.

1 "Since then the affair assumed increasing
2 proportions and extended to such areas as Chinchow,
3 Nonkiang, Harbin and Chichihar which were isolated
4 from the areas along the South Manchuria Railway.
5 Although this matter became the target of adverse
6 criticism from all quarters, it could not be helped for
7 an army, especially for an army inferior in strength,
8 to try to defeat enemy forces previous to its attack,
9 since the Manchurian Military occupied important posi-
10 tions, having a big army at its command and directed
11 its attacking pivot toward the areas along the South
12 Manchuria Railway and districts of important interests
13 or attempted to harass these areas persistently and,
14 moreover, lives and properties of Imperial residents
15 in the interior who had not been able to take refuge
16 in the areas belonging to the South Manchuria Railway
17 Company were at stake and petitions for aid had
18 arrived frequently. It is still fresh in my memory
19 that the military representative of the Lytton Investi-
20 gation Committee truly understood this point very well
21 when the committee made its field investigation.

22 "In this way I did not avoid the use of force
23 so far as it was unavoidable, but I did not hesitate
24 to make efforts to avoid the use of force so far as
25

1. it was avoidable. The peaceful settlement of the
2. affair in Kilin province by persuading General Hsi
3. Chia, Chief of the Staff of the Kilin province army
4. and the prevention from counter-attack of General
5. Chang Hai-peng and Yu Chih-shan in Mukden province and
6. General Chang Ching-hui, Commander-in-Chief of the
7. Heilungkiang army and General Ma Chang-shan (who rose
8. in revolt later) in Heilungkiang province were the
9. results of these efforts of mine.

10. "In spite of these efforts on my part troubles
11. spread all over Manchuria. Really inevitable as it was,
12. the actual holder of power in Manchuria, General Chang
13. Hsueh-liang's stay in Peking at that time deepened
14. this inevitability. I had been with Tsuo-lin, Hsueh-
15. liang's father, for three years as his military adviser.
16. During this period of time I had rather close relations
17. with him through seeing him all the time and was well
18. acquainted with his sagacity. If General Hsueh-liang
19. had been in Manchuria at that time, or if such a man
20. as General Yang Yu-ting, who very well understood
21. Sino-Japanese relations, had been in Manchuria, even
22. though General Hsueh-liang was absent, the incident
23. would not have assumed such serious proportions even
24. if we might not have nipped its outbreak in the bud,
25. and on the contrary we could have made the incident a

1 stepping stone to restoring normal general relations
2 between Japan and China, changing evil for good. It
3 is really a matter for regret whenever one considers
4 the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations since
5 that time.

6 "Chapter 3. Establishment of Manchukuo and
7 Afterwards.

8 "As mentioned above, the Kwantung Army rose
9 only in self-defense and took action only in self-
10 defense. At first we did not, therefore, consider
11 any aspect of the problem of Manchuria's future status.
12 These activities of ours, however, did not fail to
13 result in destruction of the Manchurian army as well
14 as the status of Manchuria. We were unable to hope
15 for the stabilization of life and public peace there
16 when there was no order. How could we have expected
17 the safety of our resident nationals' lives and property
18 and of Japanese interests but by the stabilization of
19 life and the public peace? For this reason I supported
20 not only the district self-governing committee which
21 was voluntarily organized by Yuan Ching-kai and others
22 in Mukden within ten days after the outbreak of the
23 incident, but also the self-governing committees of
24 various localities and thus gave impetus to self-
25 government. In addition to this, I supported the

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1 self-government direction department which was organ-
2 ized by Yu Chung-han and others in Mukden in order to
3 direct self-governing committees all over Manchuria
4 and tried very hard to maintain and improve public
5 peace and life.

6 "Nevertheless, as these organizations were only
7 makeshift and temporary, some permanent organization
8 had to be established. Indeed, a cry for this arose
9 promptly and suddenly among the self-governing direc-
10 tion department, district self-governing committee
11 circles, and military and civil notables and prominent
12 men in all quarters who know our activities well. It
13 was, of course, a matter which we were longing for and
14 so was quickly developed. I should like to speak here
15 about our desire concerning Manchuria at that time.
16 Co-existence and co-prosperity of Japan and China were
17 absolute necessities for the defense of the Japanese
18 Empire and China or Greater East Asia. At the same time
19 they were the absolute necessities from the point of
20 view of the existence for the Japanese Empire, and this
21 has been, I am sure, our true ideal towards China since
22 the Russo-Japanese War in spite of the warping of the
23 original intention and the very opposite result reached
24 because of the intervention of miscellaneous untoward
25 events, and so forth. It is further recollected that

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1 since the period of the Ching Dynasty Japanese, including
2 ourselves, took part in the efforts made for the self-
3 stabilization of China though we were only their
4 assistants. It is also recollected that those who
5 most earnestly supported the reform movement since the
6 time of Sun Wen and Hung Hsing were Japanese public-
7 spirited men and that all the prominent figures in the
8 reform movement were pro-Japanese notables or old
9 civil and military government students to Japan. This
10 applied to Manchuria most conspicuously and the Russo-
11 Japanese War was fought only on this ground. Accordingly
12 all that we expected of Manchuria after the outbreak
13 of the incident was not a matter of form, but nothing
14 else than the permanent security and co-existence and
15 prosperity of Japan and China based on the everlasting
16 foundation of normal and harmonious relations between
17 Japan and Manchuria which presupposed the stabiliza-
18 tion and prosperity of Manchuria.

19 "What concrete plan should we adopt? Should
20 we desire General Chang Hsueh-liang's return? The
21 motives which produced the outbreak of the Manchurian
22 Incident existed during General Hsueh-liang's adminis-
23 tration. Besides, after things had reached such a
24 pass that the Japanese national feeling would not
25 receive the general's return warmly. And even if they

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1 had welcomed his return, General Huseh-liang's pride
2 would no longer have made it endurable to accept this
3 welcome. The Chang family was alienated from the
4 people for the abundant reasons that the Chang family's
5 misadministration for two generations since General
6 Tsuo-lin's time and the enormous increase of expenses
7 accompanying their policy of military and administra-
8 tive advance into the areas inside the Great Wall, and
9 so forth, naturally made the extortionate taxation of
10 Manchurian inhabitants inevitable. The Chang family's
11 return to Manchuria was, therefore, impossible. How
12 about then handing over Manchuria to the Nanking Govern-
13 ment? Nothing could have been better than that from
14 the point of view of the importance of Manchuria and the
15 fundamental ideal as to relations between Japan and
16 China. But the original cause of the Manchurian Inci-
17 dent truly existed in the Nanking Government's policy
18 against Japan. Besides, the Nanking Government was
19 still in the course of bringing about and continuing a
20 state of confusion. Consequently, judging from the
21 situation at that time, handing over Manchuria to the
22 Nanking Government would have only meant giving impetus
23 to the anti-Japanese movement and confusion in Man-
24 churia. In the same as the former alternative, there-
25 fore, this case was not worth considering as an actual

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1 possibility.

2 "The opinions of notables and interested persons
3 on the Manchurian side were similar to our own opinion
4 mentioned above. Then Mr. Yu Chung-han and others
5 finally boldly advocated the establishment of a new
6 state. This proposal was unanimously supported on the
7 instant and I, of course, also agreed to it

8 "In history China has never occupied Manchuria
9 substantially, notwithstanding the fact that Manchuria
10 once occupied China completely. The majority of the
11 inhabitants in Manchuria are, it is true, of the Chinese
12 race, but most of these people have settled in Man-
13 churia for several, or more than ten generations, and
14 so they are rather more Manchurian than Chinese in
15 their life and sentiment. As the topography of Man-
16 churia is, moreover, a basin surrounded by great ranges
17 of mountains and great rivers, it is naturally suitable
18 to build as a state. If such a state could be built,
19 then the ideal would be carried out for the first time.
20 In this way on the 1st of March of the 7th year of
21 Showa (1932) the independence of Manchukuo was declared,
22 which placed its basis on the way of the king as its
23 skeleton, as this is the essence of Oriental morality,
24 and racial cooperation as its flesh, as this advocated
25 the equality of all the inhabitants, rejecting the

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1 the conception sense of the superiority of the strong,
2 and the conception of oppressing the weak and racial
3 discrimination.

4 "This being so, I expected independent Man-
5 chukuo, as mentioned above, to develop peacefully and
6 soundly. I also expected, of course, that the pro-
7 found relations between Japan and Manchuria, existing
8 from the time before the Middle Kingdom was established
9 as a state, to become normal and unshakable. I ex-
10 pected not only this, but also that having this founda-
11 tion Manchukuo would become outwardly an impregnable
12 fortress for the defense of the Orient and inwardly
13 a wedge and model for the co-existence and co-prosperity
14 between Japan and China, and at the same time it would
15 become a modern state worthy of praise from the whole
16 world, not to speak of the whole Orient. In order to
17 accomplish this purpose it was my belief that the
18 people of Manchuria should not fail to cope with the
19 difficulties of the time of transition, and that the
20 Japanese Empire also should not spare sacrifices no
21 matter how great they might be.

22 "Just after the declaration of the establish-
23 ment of the state on the 9th of March, Pu-Yi, the
24 former Emperor Hsuan Tung of the Tsing Dynasty, was
25 installed in office as Administrator of Manchukuo.

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1 From the very fact that the foundation of the establish-
2 ment of the state was based upon the cooperation of
3 races, it is clear that Pu-Yi's installation did not
4 mean the restoration of the Tsing Dynasty but, on the
5 contrary, it rather precluded the restoration both
6 legally and in sentiment. In fact, Pu-Yi was called
7 and installed in the office of administrator because
8 of his personal character and the Manchurian people's
9 retrospective sentiment for Manchukuo, because he was
10 a descendant of the Tsing Dynasty which came from
11 Manchuria.

12 "(Written in early October, 20th year of Showa.
13 (1945.)"
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1 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

2 MR. TAVENNER: May it please the Tribunal,
3 the last paragraph which was not read I understand
4 is, nevertheless, in evidence.

5 THE PRESIDENT: It will be disregarded if
6 it expresses an opinion.

7 MR. TAVENNER: That was the statement of
8 counsel, but according to our contention that para-
9 graph does contain statements of fact, and I wanted
10 to call that to the Tribunal's attention or have it
11 read into the transcript.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Apparently, you want it read
13 into the transcript; so let it be read; but we will
14 form our own conclusions.

15 Do I understand that this document is
16 offered, is something in the nature of a dying
17 declaration? Actually, it does not come within
18 that rule because HONJO was not dying when he wrote
19 it, but he did contemplate suicide, perhaps. This
20 could not be admissible under any rules of evidence
21 that we know.

22 What was HONJO's age when he became
23 Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army?

24 MR. BANNO: I think he was around fifty,
25 your Honor.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Well, read the balance of
2 the statement.

3 MR. BANNO: I shall proceed to read
4 presently, but may I make one statement before that?

5 As it is made clear, it was in September,
6 1945, that late General HONJO decided to commit sui-
7 cide and drew up his last will. Therefore, after he
8 made a decision to kill himself he wrote this book
9 entitled, "The True Nature of the Manchurian
10 Incident." In my opinion, I believe that General
11 HONJO had already made up his mind to commit sui-
12 cide at the time of the end of the war. It was
13 just a matter of deciding what the exact date would
14 be. From ancient times there is a saying which was
15 derived from China. That saying was, "When a bird
16 is about to die it sings the sweetest," and the
17 man says best and utters best words when he is
18 about to die. The meaning of the saying is that
19 even the worst culprit when confronted with death,
20 returns to his real spirit and former spirit and
21 states the true facts.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you cannot give
23 evidence of that. Read the rest of the document.

24 MR. BANNO: I have no intention to present
25 that fact in evidence. However, because your Honor

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1 I thought questioned the nature of this document,
2 I just put in a word or two by way of explanation.
3 I shall read the remainder of the testimony --
4 statement. I wanted to -- I intended to **omit** the
5 parts in which we thought he stated his opinion
6 after -- his recollection after leaving Manchuria.

7 I shall proceed to read.

8 "After one year's tenure of office I
9 resigned from the post of Commander in Chief of
10 the Kwantung Army. Consequently all major affairs
11 in Manchukuo, not to speak of the execution of the
12 monarchical rule, happened after my resignation.
13 For this reason I am not qualified to write about
14 the situation in Manchukuo after that time. It is
15 a matter for regret that conditions in Manchukuo
16 since then up to now have diverged so greatly from
17 my hopes and expectations and so definitely from the
18 true idea of the original Japanese policy toward
19 Manchuria and China. This was owing to the gradual
20 increase in the number of Japanese Manchukuo
21 officials, the lack of harmony with Manchukuo
22 officials caused thereby and the frequent changes
23 in the executions of our policy toward Manchukuo,
24 etc."

25 BY MR. BANNO (Continued):

1 Q This book entitled, "The True Nature of the
2 Manchurian Incident," is the same as the witness
3 has put down, wrote down?

4 A Yes, it is so.

5 MR. BANNO: Your witness.

6 MR. TAVENNER: There are no questions by
7 the prosecution.

8 MR. BANNO: May the witness leave the
9 court, your Honor?

10 THE PRESIDENT: He is dismissed on the
11 usual terms.

12 (Whereupon, the witness was
13 excused.)

14 MR. BANNO; I should like to have Counsel
15 YAMADA introduce another witness.

16 MR. YAMADA: I am counsel YAMADA. I request
17 to have the witness HIRATA, Yukihiro be summoned to
18 the court.

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HIRATA

DIRECT

1 Y U K I H I R O H I R A T A , called as a wit-
2 ness on behalf of the defense, being first
3 duly sworn, testified through Japanese in-
4 terpreters as follows:

5 MR. YAMADA: I request the defense docu-
6 ment 887, that is the affidavit of Witness HIRATA,
7 be shown to him.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Ask him his name and address.

9 DIRECT EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. YAMADA:

11 Q Mr. Witness, please state your name and
12 address.

13 A My name is HIRATA, Yukihiro. My address is
14 No. 51, Tairacho, Meguro-ku, Tokyo City.

15 Q Defense document No. 887, that is supposed
16 to be your affidavit, sworn deposition. Does it
17 state the true facts? Is it actually your sworn
18 deposition?

19 THE PRESIDENT: Do give him the document
20 before you ask him whether it is his.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is mine.

22 MR. YAMADA: I present defense document 887
23 as evidence.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

25 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 887

1 will receive exhibit No. 2404.

2 (Whereupon, the document above
3 referred to was marked defense exhibit
4 No. 2404 and received in evidence.)

5 MR. YAMADA: I shall proceed to read the
6 whole of court exhibit 2404.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Omit the formal parts.
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HIRATA

DIRECT

1 MR. YAMADA: (Reading)

2 "3. It was as the Colonel commanding the
3 29th Infantry Regiment, which belonged to the 2d
4 division, that I was dispatched in April, 1931, to
5 Manchuria together with the headquarters of the
6 same division. My regiment was stationed in Mukden
7 on 16 April and the headquarters of the division
8 (the divisional commander being Lieutenant General
9 TAMON) was stationed at Liaoyang. Since then I
10 served in Manchuria until August, 1932, when, as the
11 result of the regular change of personnel, I was
12 transferred to Japan to serve with the headquarters
13 of the 9th division in the City of Kanazawa. I
14 retired from the active service in 1933. My rank
15 then was Major General.

16 "4. It was while I was thus serving in
17 Manchuria that the Liutiaokou Incident (Mukden
18 Incident) broke out and by and by developed into the
19 Manchurian Incident.

20 "5. In those days in Mukden were stationed
21 the 29th Infantry Regiment under my command and the
22 2d Infantry Battalion (the commander being Lieutenant
23 Colonel SHIMAMOTO, Shoichi) of the Independent
24 Railway Guards. The former was charged with the
25 ordinary duty of the Manchurian service, that is, the

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 safeguarding of Japanese rights and interests and
2 the protection of the lines and properties of the
3 Japanese residents around Mukden, while the latter
4 was charged with the duty of guarding the South
5 Manchurian Railway within the assigned area. Since
6 their duties were in different directions, there was
7 some difference in the schemes of operation between
8 the two units. However, for the purpose of effectual
9 cooperation in case of emergency, we often practised
10 joint exercises such as emergency call drills and so
11 on. Being the senior officer in Mukden, I was in a
12 position to control and direct, as the commander of
13 the garrison area around Mukden. In other words, so
14 far as the guarding of the railway was concerned, the
15 commander of the 2d Infantry Battalion of the Inde-
16 pendent Guards was under the direct command of, and
17 acted upon the orders of, the Independent Guards
18 Commander so that in no way did I interfere with the
19 guarding; however, with regard to the general defense
20 of the Mukden garrison area, I was authorized to take
21 command over Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO himself.
22

23 "6. The Manchurian Incident broke out more
24 than five months after my arrival in Manchuria with
25 my regiment. Before the outbreak of the Incident,
however, there had never been any plot either by myself

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 or by any of my subordinates, either among themselves
2 or in league with civilians to create incidents. The
3 situation in Manchuria had been so aggravated in those
4 days that the lawful rights and interests of Japan
5 were unlawfully infringed upon, while anti-Japanese
6 and insulting words and acts prevailed all over
7 Manchuria. Stimulated by such, my soldiers were in
8 a highly strained state of mind. In view of the
9 situation as I had watched it since my arrival in
10 the Mukden Province, and in view of my own experiences
11 in the Russo-Japanese War in which I served as a
12 second lieutenant, I not only cautioned my subordinates
13 never to smear the honor of our predecessors but also
14 enforced strict military discipline to prevent any
15 disorderly conducts. About a month before the out-
16 break of the Manchurian Incident, I was approached
17 by the manager of the Mukden branch office of the
18 South Manchurian Railway Company, the president of the
19 Japanese Residents' Association, and the president of
20 the Japanese Society, who complained that many Japan-
21 ese school children living in the walled city of
22 Mukden were prevented from attending school because
23 of Manchurians who stoned at them on their way to and
24 from school, and requested me to make a demonstration
25 march in the city, so that this kind of thing would be

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 stopped once and for all. However, I was so meticu-
2 lous as to refuse to comply with this request on the
3 ground that such action might create unnecessary mis-
4 understanding.

5 "7. Just before the outbreak of the Manchurian
6 Incident, the Northeastern Chinese Army, or the Chang
7 Hsueh-Liang's army, stationed around Mukden, side by
8 side with steady increase in its number, had begun
9 to form encirclement around Japanese barracks in the
10 South Manchurian Railway zone. They consisted of one
11 mixed brigade, about 10,000 strong, at the north
12 barrack; one training regiment of infantry and artil-
13 lery mixed at the east barrack; in the northwest and
14 southwest districts outside the wall, three battalions
15 belonging to the escort unit (one of the battalions
16 being in Peiping with Chang Hsueh-Liang, and another
17 being stationed in two places as the nucleus units in
18 preparation for the reinforcement of the escort unit
19 into a regiment), and one battalion with infantry,
20 guns, and machine guns; inside the walled city, one
21 guards battalion and a corps of soldiers armed with
22 hand spears; and to the west at Ko-Ku-Ton, one battalion
23 detached from the north barrack. The total of the
24 regular force was about fifteen to sixteen thousand.
25 Besides, a police unit, more than 3,000 strong, which

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 was said to surpass soldiers in respect of training
2 and equipment, was stationed over various strategic
3 positions east of the business section. The equip-
4 ment of these units were the most excellent in whole
5 Manchuria. They were equipped with four light tanks,
6 many trench mortars and heavy machine guns, and even
7 with aeroplanes. In addition, a large quantity of
8 weapons and ammunition were being manufactured and
9 stored in the arsenals and the trench mortar arsenals.
10 Even gas bombs were being manufactured. On the other
11 hand, the Japanese forces consisted of my regiment,
12 about 1,000 strong, (two battalions of three companies
13 each and a machine gun unit) and one infantry battalion
14 of the Independent Railway Guards, about 400 strong
15 (of four companies, two were stationed away from
16 Mukden). Our armament consisted of no more than two
17 armoured cars, some infantry guns, mountain guns, and
18 heavy machine guns, all of which were inferior to
19 those of the Chinese, and we had no military aero-
20 planes at all. Under these circumstances, not only
21 in their quantity but also in their quality were we
22 constantly conscious of our inferiority and the threat
23 of the Chinese Army.

24 "8. Thus, the spirit of Chang Hsueh-Liang's
25 soldiers was very high. In fact, General Yei Tai,

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 chief of staff, once happened to tell me that while
2 high-ranking officers were mutually understanding,
3 some younger officers were expressing such strong
4 views that he could hardly control them.

5 "9. In those days there were about 20,000
6 Japanese residents in and around Mukden. Because of
7 Chang Hsueh-Liang's pressure, some of them found it
8 so difficult to carry on their business, that they
9 went back to their home country. Atrocities against
10 the Japanese, such as in the Manpausan Incident,
11 frequently occurred. Besides, there were frequent
12 disturbances to our railways. By and by, the Chinese
13 came to assume such anti-Japanese and insulting atti-
14 tudes also towards the Japanese army.

15 "10. Whenever we intended to conduct maneuvers,
16 either with blank or with ball cartridges, or to carry
17 out night maneuvers, we notified them several days
18 beforehand to the Chinese officials through the
19 Japanese Consulate. In spite of our previous notifi-
20 cation, however, it happened in the course of night
21 maneuvers towards the end of June, 1931, that some
22 soldiers attached to the Chinese Peace Preservation
23 Unit fired ball cartridges at Japanese patrols. Again,
24 in the latter part of August, 1931, when a party from
25 my regiment held a shooting practice on the outskirts

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 of Mukden, it happened that some Chinese bandits
2 violently attacked a Japanese sentry in an effort to
3 rob him of his revolver, and was arrested after a
4 close combat. The pilots of the Northeastern Army
5 were being instructed and trained by Japanese officers.
6 These Japanese instructors, however, their term of
7 office expiring on August 31, returned to Japan on
8 the morning of the 1st of September. From that very
9 day onwards, planes of the Northeastern Army began
10 to fly low over the Japanese barracks in a threaten-
11 ing manner, almost every day. Greatly menaced, we
12 were obliged to construct anti-aircraft establishments
13 in the compound of our barracks. Besides, the Captain
14 NAKAMURA Incident, which became more and more compli-
15 cated, greatly excited officers and men under my
16 command.

17 "11. In view of these circumstances,
18 General HONJO, newly appointed Commander of the Kwan-
19 tung Army, issued instructions that in case of neces-
20 sity, we should take positive action, and should
21 endeavor not to impair the prestige of our army. In
22 compliance with his instructions, I told my men, as
23 described above, to muster up their courage and not
24 to impair the honor of their predecessors.

25 "12. Such being the case, I ordered the

MIRATA

DIRECT

1 soldiers in my regiment early in September, that
2 when going out of our barracks for maneuvers they
3 should carry ball cartridges in the back ammunition
4 pouch (containing 15 rounds) attached to the belt;
5 that they should always wear gaiters when going out;
6 that no soldiers should go outside the railway zone
7 alone; and that whenever going into the walled city,
8 they should all go in groups and inform their goings.

9 "13. Consequently, more and more intense
10 drills and practices were carried on. Terrain exer-
11 cises were held night and day, while frequent night
12 maneuvers were conducted, often two or three times
13 a week. Emergency call drills were also frequently
14 carried out. Besides, maneuvers for the defense of
15 the railway zone were conducted night and day. All
16 these were so frequently and intensely carried on that
17 the citizens at large finally became accustomed to
18 them and came to regard them as nothing extraordinary.

19 "14. On the night of the 18th of September,
20 1931, I was at my official residence at Aoi-Cho,
21 Mukden, listening to the report of a certain lieuten-
22 ant colonel attached to my regiment who had returned
23 that afternoon from the topographical investigation of
24 the district where the autumnal maneuvers were expected
25 to be held. At about 10:40 p.m. Lieutenant Colonel

MIRATA

DIRECT

1 SHIMAMOTO, commander of the second battalion of the
2 Independent Garrison, reported to me over the tele-
3 phone, "as the soldiers of Chang Hsueh-Liang's army
4 stationed at the north barracks have blasted the rail-
5 way and attacked our patrol, the platoon to which the
6 patrol belongs is returning fire now. My battalion
7 is going to reinforce it at once in response to an
8 emergency call."

9 "All right!" I replied, "I will send out an
10 emergency call to our regiment and myself go to the
11 barracks. Let's arrange for particulars there."
12 Ringing off, I at once called up the officer of the
13 day and ordered him to make the emergency call. After
14 dressing up, I hurried to the barracks. On arriving
15 there, I called together the battalion commanders and
16 was about to explain the situation, when Lieutenant
17 Colonel SHIMAMOTO with arms arrived at the barracks on
18 horseback. He said, "I will attack the enemy troops
19 in the north barrack with all the strength of my
20 battalion." "All right!" I replied, "I will attack
21 the enemy in the walled city of Mukden." "Let's do
22 our utmost." After exchanging these words we parted.
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1 "According to what we were instructed prior
2 to this, the operational plan of the Kwantung Army
3 was that, because of strained relations in Manchuria,
4 in case of an emergency the Army should concentrate
5 its main force around Mukden to attack the walled
6 city as occasion demanded. Therefore my regiment had
7 been exerting itself in daily drills and other
8 practices that it might be equal to any emergency.
9 Anti-Japanese sentiments were already prevailing
10 in those days and Chang Hsueh-Liang's Army came to
11 take increasingly provocative attitudes towards the
12 Japanese forces. In view of this we who were stationed
13 in Mukden thought that an emergency might crop up
14 at any moment. Under these circumstances, we should
15 be in danger of annihilation by superior number, if
16 we relied merely on the concentration of our main
17 force. In other words, our chief concern was how to
18 fulfil our duties with the troops at hand in Mukden
19 in case of emergency.

20
21 "The situation at that time was that Chang
22 Hsueh-Liang's Army, 20,000 strong, was so disposed
23 as to encircle the railway zone of Mukden. Suppose
24 our units, totalling less than 1,500 which were
25 stationed at the positions in the railway zone
extending over 4 kilometres, were attacked by the enemy,

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 it would take at least five or six hours for the
2 garrison unit at Liaoyang, which was closest to
3 Mukden, to reinforce us, even if we transported
4 by a railway undamaged and in perfect working order.
5 Therefore, we concluded that to stick to the defense
6 positions would mean our annihilation; hence we
7 should somehow blunt the point of the probable enemy
8 attack by taking positive action and so gain time
9 till the arrival of our main force. Figuratively
10 speaking, the enemy was constantly menacing us with
11 his fist clenched, so that we believed that the
12 enemy shook that fist at us, who had just a weak
13 little body we had no choice but to get inside his
14 guard and hit his vital spot before he could strike
15 our head with his fist.

16 "16. There had been frequent cases of
17 disturbance to the railway, and in response to such
18 reports we had twice sent out emergency calls and
19 prepared for action. But this was the first time
20 that Chang Hsueh-Liang's troops attacked Japanese
21 units by firing ball-cartridges. Therefore, the
22 moment Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO reported to me
23 about the outbreak of the incident, I perceived that
24 just as I had expected Chang Hsueh-Liang's Army has
25 taken the offensive against us according to a definite

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 plan. I judged that at last they had lifted their
2 fist to strike us. Thus, when Lieutenant Colonel
3 SHIMAMOTO reported to me, 'The entire garrison
4 battalion will reinforce my men who are fighting
5 back,' I agreed and gave my approval.

6 "17. By ITAGAKI, a staff officer of the
7 Kwantung Army, who happened to be at the Mukden
8 Special Service Office, we were informed of the
9 Kwantung Army intention along similar lines. This
10 made us much elated. However, in order to attack
11 the enemy at their vital spot, I thought we should
12 not be successful unless we took at least the west
13 wall of the strongly fortified inner wall. I
14 therefore asked ITAGAKI to approve of my operational
15 plan stating, 'It is natural that if we rout Chang
16 Hsueh-Liang's troops within the outer walls, we
17 should rush by momentum the west wall of the inner
18 castle. To occupy and hold the west wall to-night
19 will be most advantageous for our attack tomorrow.
20 I request your approval of our occupying the enemy's
21 positions as far as the west wall.' He gave his
22 approval. Thereupon, I went back to the barracks
23 and gave the following orders to the Lieutenant
24 Colonel attached to my regiment, the Commanders of
25 battalions and the Commanders of machine gun units.

HIRATA

DIRECT

"1. The attacking units:

"(a) The First Battalion (less the First Company but reinforced by one platoon each of infantry guns and heavy machine guns) shall attack and occupy the first and third barracks of the guards and the trench motor arsenal.

"(b) The Second Battalion (less the Seventh Company but reinforced by the main force of the machine gun unit) shall seize the west wall of the inner castle immediately after capturing the second barracks of the guards and the barracks of the machine gun unit.

"(c) The Seventh Company shall keep watch over the Peace Preservation Unit (the police unit) in the business section and if necessary, shall disarm them.

"(d) The First Company shall remain as reserve for the regiment, but one platoon shall join the main force after disrupting main communication lines leading from the walled city of Mukden.

"2. Guard corps:

"One squad from each company shall remain and organize a unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel INAMI for maintaining peace and order in the railway zone and protect the lives and properties

HIMATA

DIRECT

1 of Japanese residents, specially the unit should
2 keep strict watch over the enemy stationed at
3 Huangkutun. Then, under the regimental colors,
4 I gave instructions to the battalions one by one
5 as they lined up. I cautioned them particularly
6 that 'our enemy is Chang Hsueh-Liang's army and not
7 the Chinese people. The people should be given
8 assurance.'

9 "After that, I made all march off one
10 after another. The First Battalion, the first to
11 set out, left at about 12:40 a.m. on the 19th, and
12 I started last from the barracks with the reserve
13 force at a little past 1:00 a.m.

14 "18. Over two hours elapsed between the
15 emergency call issued after Lieutenant Colonel
16 SHIMAMOTO's telephone report and the time I started
17 from the barracks.
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HIRATA

DIRECT

1 "19. On their way to the objectives our
2 units were fired upon by detachments of the Chinese
3 police force, but they marched on, either disregard-
4 ing them or after disarming them. The First Bat-
5 talion, as ordered, occupied the barracks and trench
6 motor arsenal by 3:00 a. m. by crushing the resis-
7 tance made by the Guards. By crushing the resistance
8 of the second unit of the Guards and in defiance of
9 machine gun fire, the Second Battalion occupied the
10 wall at the northwest corner of the inner castle at
11 about 2:30 a.m. on the 19th. Then it seized the
12 southwest wall, and so on, until at last it captured
13 the west wall completely by about 3:00 a. m. During
14 these clashes, one officer and six soldiers were
15 wounded, two of them were wounded in the attack by
16 the police unit and the other five in the attack
17 by the regular army, whereas the enemy left about
18 thirty regular soldiers dead.

19 "20. I asked the Special Service Office to
20 report the action of my regiment to the headquarters
21 of the Second Division. As soon as my regiment
22 occupied the west wall, I ordered an officer to go
23 to Mukden Station to report it to the Divisional
24 Commander who was expected to arrive there. I
25 was at the office of the Japanese Residents' Asso-

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 ciation outside the Hsiehshienmen gate at about
2 5:00 a. m. on the 19th, when a staff officer of
3 the Division came along to transmit the purport of
4 the order of the Division. He told me that the
5 units under the Commander of the 15th Brigade were
6 expected to march along the south side of the Mukden
7 Castle, keeping in touch with my regiment, so that
8 my regiment should advance as far as the east wall
9 of the inner castle at once. So I ordered the units
10 of my regiment to advance as far as the streets
11 within the outer walls north of the east wall of
12 the inner castle, where those units were expected
13 to keep in touch with one another. Pursuant to the
14 order, the Second Battalion advanced, and after
15 accepting the surrender of the Direct Guards unit
16 stationed in the inner castle and disarming it, the
17 Battalion occupied also the barracks of the spear
18 unit who had all run away, and then occupied the
19 east wall completely at about 6:00 a. m. The First
20 Battalion occupied the streets in the north area
21 of the outer castle in cooperation with the Second
22 Battalion. Together with the reserve force, I
23 arrived at the Hsiapiemen gate of the inner castle
24 where we came under the command of the Division
25 Commander.

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 "21. On the other hand, the small unit
2 which had remained behind as guards in the railway
3 zone was, under difficult conditions, prepared for
4 the attack of the enemy stationed at Huangkutun
5 in cooperation with the police unit and an emergency
6 unit composed of military police and members of the
7 Reservists' Association. These units could thorough-
8 ly fulfil their duties, such as maintenance of public
9 order in the railway zone and protection of the lives
10 and properties of the Japanese residents.

11 "22. I have already referred to the heavy
12 guns which had been mounted in Mukden. I knew of
13 them, but as they belonged to the Independent Garri-
14 son, I had had no time to learn about them in detail.
15 Thus the action of my regiment had nothing to do
16 with them.

17 "23. When the members of the China Inquiry
18 Commission of the League of Nations came to Mukden,
19 I -- as a participant in the Manchurian Incident --
20 explained to them the situation at the time of its
21 outbreak, the gist of which was much the same as that
22 which I have stated above. As might be expected of
23 military men, soldier members of the Committee,
24 Major-General McCoy and General Claudel, apparently
25 understood the actual situation quite well."

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 MR. YAMATA: I request your Honor to be
2 permitted to put an additional question to the
3 witness.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, an additional ques-
5 tion.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

6
7 BY MR. YAMATA (Continued):

8 Q Mr. Witness, in your sworn statement it
9 is stated that when you returned to the barracks
10 you met Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO and he men-
11 tioned something to you. What was that he told you?

12 A Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO reported to me
13 as follows. He said, "In order to save the troops
14 under my command, the units which had proceeded south
15 along the railway -- the company which came down
16 south along the railway of the Hushihtai were met
17 by about four to five hundred troops, enemy troops,
18 possessing infantry guns and machine guns.

19 THE MONITOR: Slight correction: "The
20 company which came down south along the railway from
21 Hushihtai" instead of "of Hushihtai."

22 A (Continued) Already officers and men had
23 suffered casualties and they were having a heated
24 battle. I shall lead the entire force of the battal-
25 ion and attack Feltayin."

HIRATA

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I told him to do his utmost.

THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

HIRATA

DIRECT

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Counselor YAMADA.

4 MR. YAMADA: The answer given by the witness
5 before the recess, I understand there was a slight mis-
6 translation. May I have that answer retranslated?
7 BY MR. YAMADA (Continued):

8 Q Mr. Witness, you said -- you stated that
9 Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO told you that "Please
10 take care of the affairs after my leave." What did
11 it mean?

12 A I don't know exactly but I believe most
13 likely what Colonel SHIMAMOTO meant was that because
14 he was leaving for Peitaiying he desired to have me
15 take care of matters after he had left for that
16 destination -- take care of matters with determination
17 and resolve.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Oh, we don't want to hear any
19 more of those things. They are immaterial. This
20 affidavit of his is overloaded with unnecessary details.

21 Q When was it, Mr. Witness, that you made
22 decision to attack the walled city of Mukden?

23 (Whereupon, the witness answered in
24 Japanese.)
25

MR. COMYNS CARR: Before that answer is

HIRATA

DIRECT

1 translated, Your Honor --

2 THE PRESIDENT: It must be translated,
3 Mr. Carr.

4 MR. COMYNS CARR: I would like to object to
5 it.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the English?
7 Let us hear it.

8 A When Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO came to
9 the barracks and informed me, made his report to me,
10 I sensed that myself and the troops under my command
11 were in danger of being annihilated. Therefor, I made
12 a decision to attack the walled city of Mukden.

13 MR. COMYNS CARR: I object to any further
14 questions --

15 THE PRESIDENT: We don't control those lights;
16 they control us, Mr. Carr.

17 THE MONITOR: Slight modification in the
18 previous interpretation: When Lieutenant Colonel
19 SHIMAMOTO made a report to me at the barracks I came
20 to the conclusion that, unless we attack the walled city
21 of Mukden then, our forces would eventually be faced
22 with annihilation. Therefore, I made that decision
23 to carry out the attack.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Carr.

25 MR. COMYNS CARR: Just a few questions, your

HIRATA

CROSS

Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

Q General HIRATA, in paragraph 6 of your affidavit you say that before the Manchurian Incident broke out you received complaints from various Japanese organizations in Mukden about the hostile behavior of the Manchurian toward them. Is that right?

A Yes, it is so. The president of the Japanese Association, also the president of the Japanese residents Association, and the bureau chief of the South Manchurian Railway in Mukden came to me and reported such incidents. These three expressed their desire that the military would make a demonstration march in the walled cities -- within the walled cities of Mukden in order to show a display of military force. My reply to this was that misunderstandings might arise if such a demonstration were carried out and, therefore, I could not concede to their request.

Q Other defense witnesses have told us that the Manchurians were anxious for the Japanese to help them to create an independent state and liberate them from the Chinese. Do you know why they threw stones at their deliverers?

A I don't know the reason. As a matter of fact

HIRATA

CROSS

1 I am not aware or informed of any movement for inde-
2 pendence.

3 Q Now, in paragraph 14 you say that you got
4 the first news of the alleged blowing up of the rail-
5 way from Colonel SHIMAMOTO at about 10 40 p.m. and
6 that he said, "As the soldiers of Chang Hsueh-liang's
7 army stationed at the North Barracks have blasted the
8 railway and attacked our patrol --" Did you ask him
9 whether he was there and saw this personally?

10 A I believe that Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO
11 was not actually on the spot.

12 Q You gave your evidence to the Lytton Commis-
13 sion, you tell us. Is that right?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Do you know that a certain Lieutenant KAWAMOTO
16 also gave evidence to them?

17 A I have heard of it but I haven't been directly
18 informed of this.

19 Q Did you ask Colonel SHIMAMOTO where he got
20 his information from?

21 A I did not make any inquiries to this effect
22 of Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO. I judged that he made
23 his report to me assuming the responsibility.
24
25

HIRATA

CROSS

1 Q Did you consider it right to make any
2 investigation as to the truth of his report before
3 ordering the attack?

4 A At that time I did not have the leeway or
5 time to take such a thing into consideration. Since
6 we had been menaced by the enemy constantly, I felt
7 that if we wasted any time in making investigations,
8 and so forth, we would meet a disastrous fate from
9 the enemy.

10 Q Do you know where KAWAMOTO is now?

11 A I have never met this person KAWAMOTO. I
12 do not know where he is.

13 Q When you got to the barracks, as you tell us,
14 and spoke to Colonel SHIMAMOTO, did you ask him then
15 where he had got the information from?

16 A I did not ask him where he received his in-
17 formation. I assumed that he had received it from
18 reports from subordinates.

19 Q For all you knew, then, it might have been
20 the Japanese who blew up the railway?

21 A I do not know in the least that Japanese --
22 there is any evidence that Japanese had blown up the
23 railway. I heard the report from Lieutenant Colonel
24 SHIMAMOTO, and I fully believed his report.

25 THE MONITOR: The guilty party was the

HIRATA

CROSS

1 soldiers stationed at Peitaiying.

2 Q For instance, if, as we allege, it was Colonel
3 ITAGAKI who arranged for the railway to be blown up, you
4 know nothing to the contrary?

5 A I do not know anything of such a nature. Further,
6 I do not believe that the Japanese were responsible for
7 blowing up the railway.

8 THE MONITOR: Instead of "I do not believe," it
9 should say that "It is unthinkable to me to think that the
10 Japanese would blow up the railway."

11 Q Did you, before ordering this attack, find out
12 how much damage had been done to the railway?

13 A I had no time to investigate the damages.

14 Q You only had time to start a great war?

15 Now, in paragraph 16 of your affidavit, you say
16 this was the first time that Chang Hsueh-liang's troops
17 attacked Japanese units by firing ball cartridges. Who
18 told you that?

19 A I learned it through the report by Lieutenant
20 Colonel SHIMAMOTO.

21 Q But you know there is nothing about that in the
22 report of Colonel SHIMAMOTO as you stated it in
23 paragraph 14?

24 A Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO reported the first
25 time that Japanese patrols had been attacked at the North

HIRATA

CROSS

Barracks.

1 THE MONITOR: Attacked by the soldiers from
2 North Barracks or Peitaiying.

3 Q Did he tell you how many of them?

4 A At first I was not informed -- we had no
5 accurate figures as to the strength of the enemy.
6 But in the second report at the barracks, I learned
7 that the enemy strength numbered anywhere between four
8 to five hundred.

9 Q That is not what I asked you. I asked you
10 how many of them were alleged to have fired upon
11 your troops in the first place.

12 A In the first report there were no definite
13 figures mentioned when report was made that a Japanese
14 patrol had been attacked by the soldiers from the North
15 Barracks, but that a platoon had gone to reinforce the
16 troops who were fired upon. We were not informed of
17 the exact strength of the troops.

18 Q Do you know that KAWAMOTO says there were
19 only five or six?

20 A I have not heard of it.

21 Q And you didn't trouble to inquire?

22 A Because I felt that if we delayed taking
23 action we would suffer disaster from the enemy, we
24 did not investigate the number of the enemy -- we did
25

HIRATA

CROSS

1 not have the leeway or time to check on the strength
2 of the enemy.

3 Q Wasn't that because you were determined to
4 make this the excuse for starting a major operation?

5 A That is not true.

6 Q Now, you said just now that these Chinese
7 troops came from the North Barracks. Who told you
8 that?

9 A I believe that this was true from the reports
10 I received from Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO.

11 Q Did you ask him how he knew?

12 A No, but I believe that Lieutenant Colonel
13 SHIMAMOTO had received the reports from his subordi-
14 nates.

15 Q Do you know that KAWAMOTO doesn't say a word
16 about that?

17 A I know nothing at all of what KAWAMOTO said.
18 I do not know him personally.

19 THE MONITOR: Correction: I know nothing of
20 what Lieutenant Colonel KAWAMOTO said. I do not know
21 the person.

22 Q But don't you know he was the man from whom
23 Colonel SHIMAMOTO was supposed to have got his
24 information?
25

A I believe that -- I assumed that Lieutenant

HIRATA

CROSS

1 Colonel SHIMAMOTO received his information from
2 troops or officers under his command.
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1 Q But you didn't trouble to ask who they
2 were or what they had said?

3 A As I have stated previously, we were always
4 constantly under the threat of -- the menace of
5 troops under Chang Hsueh-liang, therefore when we
6 heard that the enemy had taken positive action we
7 had no time to make any detailed investigation.

8 Q Had you heard complaints such as we have
9 had from defense witnesses in this court about the
10 railway being molested by bandits?

11 A As I have stated in my deposition, I had
12 heard on many occasions that the railways were
13 attacked. Moreover, I heard twice that these
14 attacks were conducted by troops stationed in the
15 North Barracks.

16 Q Would you now answer the question?

17 A I should like to have the question asked
18 once more.

19 Q Had you heard complaints that the railway
20 had been molested by bandits?

21 A I have heard on many occasions.

22 Q And how did you know that these men,
23 supposing there were any truth in the story at all,
24 were not bandits?
25

HIRATA

CROSS

1 A By the report made by Lieutenant Colonel
2 SHIMAMOTO. I am positive -- I believe that it was
3 as he had reported.

4 Q Did you cause a report to be made to
5 General HONJO?

6 A At that time I went to contact the Special
7 Service office. Colonel DOHIHARA, the chief of the
8 office, was absent at that time, and Major HANAYA
9 was acting in his behalf. It was my intention to
10 have reports sent to the commander of the Second
11 Division, and also of the commander in chief -- to
12 the commander in chief, through Major HANAYA.

13 Q Do you know that HANAYA reported to General
14 HONJO's headquarters that the railway had been
15 exploded by three or four companies of Chinese
16 regulars?

17 A I assumed that the Special Service office
18 was already informed briefly of the attack, there-
19 fore I merely asked that they make the report to
20 the division -- commander of the Second Division
21 and to the commander in chief.

22 Q Now would you answer the question?

23 A I shall state again from the beginning.

24 Q Please don't. Just answer the question.

25 I will repeat it.

HIRATA

CROSS

1 Do you know that the Special Service officer
2 reported to General HONJO's headquarters that the
3 railway had been exploded by three or four companies
4 of Chinese regulars?

5 You can answer that yes or no.

6 A Major HANAYA was not at the Special Service
7 office when I went. Instead staff officer ITAGAKI
8 was present. I therefore asked that ITAGAKI convey
9 to -- send the message to the commander of the
10 Second Division, and to the commander in chief of
11 my division to make the attack.

12 THE MONITOR: Mr. Carr, we just finished
13 interpreting your latest question.

14 A I do not know that such a report was made.

15 Q Simple.

16 Well, now then, about Colonel ITAGAKI. Do
17 you know why Colonel ITAGAKI was in Mukden that
18 night?

19 A I do not know.

20 Q Do you know that Major General TATEKAWA,
21 from Tokyo, was there also?

22 A No, I do not know.

23 Q Would it be right to say that it was
24 Colonel ITAGAKI who ordered you and Colonel
25 SHIMANOTO to make these attacks?

HIRATA

CROSS

1 A I do not believe that staff officer ITAGAKI
2 has the authority to make -- give me direct orders.

3 Q Now will you answer the question?
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1 THE PRESIDENT: Did he give you the orders
2 whether he had authority or not?

3 THE WITNESS: He did not give any orders.

4 Q Are you familiar with the volume called
5 "Outline of the Course of the Manchurian Incident
6 Campaign," a Japanese official publication?

7 A I do not know of it.

8 Q You don't. All right.

9 In paragraph 19 of your affidavit you said,
10 "The First Battalion, as ordered, occupied the bar-
11 racks and trench motor arsenal by 3:00 a.m. by crush-
12 ing the resistance made by the Guards." Would it be
13 right to say that that attack took the Chinese com-
14 pletely by surprise?

15 A That I do not know.

16 Q You were in command, were you not?

17 A I did not command directly; my subordinates
18 took direct command.

19 Q Do you know that it took them so much by sur-
20 prise that all the lights were on in the barracks when
21 your troops fired into them?

22 A I have not heard of that for sure.

23 Q In paragraph 22 you say that you knew of the
24 heavy guns which had been installed in Mukden. Who
25 ordered them to be installed?

HIRATA

CROSS

1 A As I have mentioned in my deposition, I was
2 not informed of the details. I do not know of any
3 details.

4 Q How did you get to know about it at all?

5 A When I learned of it for certain, it was
6 when these guns actually fired that night.

7 Q Do you know that they were installed in
8 secret and that the story was given out that a well
9 was being sunk?

10 A I have heard of that as a rumor only.

11 Q If you, the Japanese, had a right to install
12 them, why the secrecy?

13 A That is something which I do not know.

14 Q Do not you know very well that they were
15 installed for the very purpose of being used in this
16 operation which you were going to carry out on the
17 night of the 18th of September?

18 A I do not know at all.

19 Q Last question: In paragraph 23 you say that
20 you gave all the information which is in your affidavit
21 to the Lytton Commission, and you go on to say that
22 Major General McCoy and General Claudel, as military
23 men, apparently understood the actual situation quite
24 well. Do you know that they understood it so well that
25 they signed the report with their colleagues?

HIRATA

CROSS

1 A I am not well informed of such facts.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Counsel YAMADA.

3 MR. YAMADA: There is no redirect, your
4 Honor. May the witness stand down the box?

5 THE PRESIDENT: The witness is at liberty
6 on the usual terms.

7 (Whereupon, the witness was ex-
8 cused.)

9 THE PRESIDENT: Recall the witness. Bring
10 him back.

11 (Whereupon, the witness resumed the
12 stand.)

13 THE PRESIDENT: You are still on oath.

14 If ITAGAKI had no authority to give you
15 orders, why did you request his approval of your plan
16 of attack?

17 THE WITNESS: I did not ask for his approval.
18 I merely asked -- informed him of my resolve to con-
19 duct the attack and to inform the commander of the
20 division and of the commander-in-chief of my resolu-
21 tion to do so.

22 THE PRESIDENT: At page 11 of exhibit 2404,
23 which is your affidavit, the following appears: "I,
24 therefore, asked ITAGAKI to approve of my operational
25 plan --," and you go on to say that you said to

HIRATA

1 ITAGAKI,"I request your approval of our occupying
2 the enemy's positions as far as the west wall." He
3 gave his approval."

4 THE WITNESS: It was staff officer ITAGAKI's
5 opinion that it would be, perhaps, better to make
6 preparations before the west wall.

7 It was staff officer ITAGAKI's opinion that
8 attack should be carried out short of the west wall --
9 short of capturing the west wall, but it was my
10 opinion that it would be better to capture the west
11 wall.

12 THE MONITOR: I believed it was necessary to
13 capture the west wall.

14 THE PRESIDENT: You cannot evade answering
15 the question that way. You say in your affidavit you
16 sought ITAGAKI's approval of your plans. You said
17 here that he had no authority to direct you. How
18 do you reconcile the two?

19 THE PRESIDENT: Because of the difference
20 of views between staff officer ITAGAKI and myself,
21 I merely asked that he approve of my views. If it
22 were a direct order, regardless of my views -- regard-
23 less of whether my views coincided with his or not,
24 I would have to conform to his orders -- obey his
25 orders.

HIRATA

1 THE PRESIDENT: How did you know of ITAGAKI's
2 opinion?

3 THE WITNESS: When I informed staff officer
4 ITAGAKI of my plans, he stated that he believed it
5 would be better to capture the barracks before reach-
6 ing the west wall and there to prepare for the opera-
7 tions on the following day.

8 THE PRESIDENT: But you said you told
9 ITAGAKI of your plan because you knew his contrary
10 opinion before that.

11 THE WITNESS: That is not true. When I met
12 staff officer ITAGAKI, then for the first time we
13 exchanged views.

14 THE PRESIDENT: We can form our own con-
15 clusions.

16 Would you like to ask any further questions
17 in view of the questions from the bench?

18 MR. YAMADA: I have no questions to ask the
19 witness, your Honor.

20 THE PRESIDENT: The witness is released on
21 the usual terms.

22 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

23 We will adjourn until half-past one.

24 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was
25 taken.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

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The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mattice.

MR. MATTICE: May it please the Tribunal,
the defense intended to offer at this time the
witness SHIMAMOTO, who is not present, however,
being ill and unable to attend. He lives and is
ill at a point some distance from Tokyo.

We have a statement from Doctor SHIMA, who is
attending this individual, which, however, is not
sworn to, but is a statement which says that the
above named, SHIMAMOTO, Shoichi, is suffering from
gallstone, and is under treatment. He will require
a rest of one month more for convalescence. It is
dated March 14, 1947. Signed SHIMA, Shunichi.

Because we feel that it more properly fits in
this phase of the case, at this point we desire to
offer in evidence the affidavit of SHIMAMOTO, which
is defense document 834.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

MR. TAVENNER: If it please the Tribunal,
this witness is the same person alluded to frequently
by the witness who just left the stand. The same

1 person has given another affidavit, which is docu-
2 ment 703 and appears on the order list the second
3 below the affidavit now sought to be introduced.

4 The present affidavit relates to par-
5 ticulars on the activities of Japanese troops, and
6 it is impossible from the examination of this
7 affidavit to determine on its face what part of it
8 is hearsay and what part is not.

9 The source of the affidavit, as shown by
10 the certificate, is also a matter of some doubt or
11 some question, therefore it is our purpose to cross-
12 examine this witness, and we think he should be here
13 at the time the affidavit is read.

14 I want to point out, in that connection, the
15 medical certificate that is given alludes to a per-
16 son other than that of the affiant, that is, on its
17 face, in that the first name is Shoichi, where the
18 first name of the affiant is Misaichi. Now it may
19 be the same person or it may be another member of
20 his family. However that may be, this medical
21 certificate in itself does not state facts which we
22 think the Tribunal would be warranted in consider-
23 ing the question of whether he is able to be here
24 now or not.
25

This gives rise to an even larger question.

1 This is the fourth or fifth witness and there is
2 another later on in this order list, as to whom
3 medical certificates have been presented or state-
4 ments have been made that they were not in physical
5 condition to be present.

6 We have considered this matter and we think
7 we should call it to your Honor's attention, because
8 we are definitely of the opinion that before an
9 application is received by the Tribunal for the
10 admission of an affidavit where the affiant can not be
11 present at the time for cross-examination, that we
12 should have sufficient notice in advance so where it
13 seems a proper case for us to do so and a medical
14 examination can be made by a physician to be selected
15 by the Tribunal before action is taken as to whether
16 or not a proposed witness is, as a matter of fact,
17 incapable of attendance in court.

18 THE PRESIDENT: This certificate was given
19 twenty days ago. He then required a month's rest.
20 He should be available within a fortnight.
21

22 MR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir, and we object to
23 the reading of the affidavit in evidence under the
24 circumstances shown on the face of this particular
25 certificate.

1 THE PRESIDENT: If you are determined to
2 cross-examine there is no advantage in taking the
3 affidavit today.

4 MR. TAVENNER: Now, as this question seems
5 to be arising so frequently, we would like for the
6 Tribunal to consider the propriety of procedure
7 along the line that I have suggested.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Court
9 would like this affidavit to be read when the
10 witness is available, in the usual way.

11 MR. MATTICE: I take it the same will
12 apply to the second affidavit, document 703.

13 The defense now offers in evidence document
14 No. 824, which is a map showing the disposition of
15 the Chinese garrison power around the Mukden pro-
16 vincial wall, compiled by the General Staff of the
17 Kwantung Army, December 1930.

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THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

1 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, this document
2 is like another map with figures on it which was dealt
3 with yesterday. The only certificate with it is
4 by Mr. BANNO, Counsel, to the effect that the document
5 came into his possession in 1939 and has been in his
6 custody ever since. With regard to that document,
7 the Tribunal put it back until proper proof of the
8 figures was produced, and I ask the Tribunal to do
9 the same in this case.
10

11 The only other observation about it I have
12 to make is that in my submission it is not material
13 to know how Chinese troops were disposed in
14 November 1930, because the disposition may easily
15 have been quite different in September 1931.

16 MR. MATTICE: It is true, if the Tribunal
17 please, that a search is being made for the book from
18 which these maps were taken. I am not informed
19 whether they have been able to find it. Perhaps
20 we had better pass that for the present.

21 Now, the witness OYAMA, next on the running
22 commentary, Language Section, is not present.

23 The witness TAKEDA will now be called. He
24 will be examined by Mr. BANNO.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

1 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, may we inquire
2 why the witness OYAMA is not present? He works in
3 an office in the grounds of this building.

4 MR. MATTICE: The reason, if the Tribunal
5 please, is the difficulty which of course has beset
6 us for some time. His affidavit has not been processed;
7 we do not have it yet.

8 THE PRESIDENT: We have an affidavit here
9 purporting to be a copy of one by OYAMA, Fumio. Is
10 that the same name?

11 MR. COMYNS CARR: It has also been served
12 upon us, your Honor.

13 THE PRESIDENT: It purports to be signed and
14 sealed on the 24th of December 1946.

15 MR. MATTICE: If the Court please, there are
16 two affidavits, and the one your Honor has is 347.
17 The one which it is desired to be used, and the later
18 affidavit, is the one which has not come through
19 from processing. We are waiting for it.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Does the running commentary
21 disclose two affidavits by this witness?

22 Well, the running commentary discloses only
23 one affidavit by this witness or proposed witness.
24 We want an explanation.

25 MR. MATTICE: If the Court please, the running

TAKEDA

DIRECT

commentary carries the number 347, but that is not
the affidavit. The affidavit is defense document 897.
There was a mistake in the number on the commentary.
And 897 has not come out from the processing.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. BANNO.

MR. BANNO: I wish to call Witness TAKEDA,
Hisashi.

- - - -

H I S A S H I T A K E D A, called as a witness
on behalf of the defense, having first been
duly sworn, testified through Japanese
interpreters as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BANNO:

Q What is your name?

A My name is TAKEDA, Hisashi.

Q Where do you live?

A I live at No. 9215 Ina, Ina-Machi,
Kami-Ina-Gun, Nagano Prefecture.

Q How old are you now?

A I am fifty-four years old.

Q Now I will show you defense document
No. 885. Will you look at it and examine if it is
your affidavit. Is what is said in that affidavit
all true? Is that your affidavit?

TAKEDA

DIRECT

1 A Yes, it is. There is no mistake.

2 MR. BANNO: I tender in evidence defense
3 document No. 885.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 885
6 will receive exhibit No. 2405.

7 (Whereupon, the document above
8 referred to was marked defense exhibit
9 No. 2405 and received in evidence.)

10 MR. BANNO: Before reading defense exhibit
11 No. 2405, I should like to add a few words by way of
12 explanation.

13 After having examined this affidavit care-
14 fully, we have decided to omit considerable parts
15 of this affidavit which include witness' opinions,
16 details and other immaterial statements; and
17 especially after having called the witness KATAKURA
18 and having heard his testimony, we have omitted from
19 this affidavit parts which tend to be repetitious --
20 which we thought would be repetitious.

21 We intended to submit to the Court the
22 revised affidavit -- errata correcting the witness'
23 affidavit, but due to technical difficulties we were
24 not able to do so. We have therefore given to the
25 Language Section a copy of the affidavit with the

TAKEDA

DIRECT

1 sections omitted and it will be read as such, and we
2 should like to request that the Court consider that the
3 portions omitted have been those sections which have
4 been deleted from this affidavit.

5 I will read the affidavit now, omitting the
6 parts.
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TAKEDA

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1 "I. SITUATION BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF
2 THE INCIDENT

3 "Towards the latter part of August in the
4 6th year of Showa (1931) Lieutenant General HONJO,
5 the newly appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army,
6 arrived at his post. At the beginning of September
7 he started his first tour of inspection and review.
8 I was then in his suite. The reports submitted to
9 the new Commander of the Kwantung Army by the unit
10 commanders at the time were filled with righteous
11 indignation at the contemptuous attitude of the
12 Chinese authorities toward our Army, the recent re-
13 peated interruptions to the traffic on the South
14 Manchurian Railway line and the oppressive and
15 insulting treatment of our nationals in the districts.
16 Alarming rumors were current among the local officials
17 and people, which somehow foreshadowed the coming evils.
18 The new commander always remained calm and serene,
19 and warned his men and the local officials and nationals
20 against hasty and ill-considered acts, cordially per-
21 suading them to endure the difficulties with patience.
22 On September 12 when the new commander inspected the
23 Independent Garrison at Kunchuling, Lieutenant General
24 MORI, the commander of the Garrison, submitted a report
25 to the effect that the anti-Japanese movement of the

TAKEDA

DIRECT

1 Chinese officials and people had been remarkably
2 systematized, with the result that bandits had begun
3 to dominate the districts so rampantly that there
4 were signs that the outlaws, ignoring our army,
5 were going to disturb the South Manchurian Railway
6 as well as the zone attached to it. The railway
7 guards of the Independent garrison had been ordered
8 strictly to be most patient so as to refrain from
9 taking positive action outside the railway zone.

10 "II. OUTBREAK OF THE INCIDENT AND THE
11 CALLING OUT OF OUR ARMY

12 "Completing the inspection tour of the army,
13 Lieutenant General HONJO, accompanied by his staff,
14 returned to Port Arthur shortly after 10:00 p.m. on
15 September 18.

16 "I was so exhausted from the week's inspec-
17 tion tour that I soon fell asleep. I had scarcely
18 slept for an hour when a loud clang of the bell woke
19 me. I got up, wondering what was the matter. KATAKURA,
20 a fellow staff officer, who was my neighbor, told me
21 that something serious had happened and that we were
22 all to meet at Chief of Staff MIYAKE's official resi-
23 dence. When I reached the residence I found the
24 Chief of the Staff sitting with KATAKURA and NAKANO,
25 another staff officer. KATAKURA, without uttering a

TAKEDA

DIRECT

1 word, handed me the purport of which was as follows
2 and was the first news:

3 "Receiving a report that frenzied Chinese
4 soldiers, at about 10:00 p.m. on the 18th destroyed
5 part of the South Manchurian Railway line on the west
6 of Peitaiying which lies to the north of Mukden, and
7 attacked our garrison, the Second Infantry battalion
8 of the Independent Garrison at Mukden has been dis-
9 patched to the spot.'

10 "I remained silent for a while as the
11 realization dawned that what was to happen had at
12 last come to pass. After a while all the other
13 staff officers came to join us, and we moved to the
14 main office of the headquarters about 100 metres
15 away and studied measures to cope with the situation.
16 It was all so sudden and coming as it did upon the
17 completion of the army commander's important annual
18 inspection, both officers and men were relieved of
19 strain and had probably been resting. The fact is, I
20 myself was one of those who were caught off their
21 guard. All that came to me at that moment were vision
22 of the confused scene at Mukden and my earnest hope
23 for the success of our troops. Meanwhile the second
24 report reached us, the gist of which read as follows:

25 "An enemy unit of the Peitaiying barracks

TAKEDA

DIRECT

1 has blown part of the South Manchurian Railway line.
2 The strength of the enemy is as three or four infantry
3 companies. Our company dispatched from Hushitai after
4 11 o'clock is now fighting the 500 or 600 enemy troops.
5 A corner of the enemy barracks has been taken by our
6 troops. The enemy is now reinforcing with machine
7 gun and infantry guns. Our company is fighting with
8 desperation. Lieutenant NODA seriously wounded.'

9 "It was at this time that Commander of the
10 Army HONJO arrived at the headquarters and entered
11 his office room, speechless, and looking sad. Major
12 General MIYAKE and ISHIHARA, staff officer in charge
13 of operations, followed him into the room. A few
14 minutes later staff officer ISHIHARA came back with
15 his lips firmly set. (The staff officer told us)
16 that the Commander had made a firm resolution after
17 deep meditation and had solemnly declared, 'Well, I
18 will carry it out on my responsibility.' At these
19 words, which cleared the air, I was freed from the
20 feeling of uncertainty which had occupied my mind for
21 a while, and reached a confident belief that the only
22 way for me to follow was to make my utmost efforts in
23 accordance with the Commander's solemn and decisive
24 resolution.
25

"Between 1:30 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on the 19th

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1 orders were given to each unit. A change was made
2 in the plan of operations already provided in peace
3 time concerning the movement of the unit stationed at
4 Changchun. According to our original plan that unit
5 was also to go to Mukden. But Commander HONJO ordered
6 that it should not do so, thinking it adequate for
7 the corps to be standing by at Changchun, preparing
8 for actions as it was too early for it to advance on
9 Mukden in accordance with the scanty information they
10 had obtained at that time.

11 "A report was made to the Central Authorities
12 and a telegram requesting the dispatch of additional
13 troops was sent to the Commander of the Korean Army
14 according to the definite agreement made in normal
15 times. The gist of the telegram ran as follows:

16 "About (10:30 p.m.) on the 18th the Chinese
17 troops at Mukden made a sudden attack on our garrison.
18 All our forces are fighting desperately with the enemy.
19 The army has decided to attack Mukden with full strength.
20 You will please dispatch reinforcement as soon as pos-
21 sible.

22 "As it was feared that the Chinese troops
23 stationed near Koupantzu, Chinchow, might make a rear-
24 attack upon us while our troops were fighting alongside
25 the South Manchurian Railway Line, the army asked Rear

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1 Admiral TSUDA, the Commander of the Second
2 Dispatched Fleet, which was then near Tsingtao,
3 to collaborate by dispatching part of the squadron to
4 the offing of Yingkao. But Commander TSUDA assuring
5 that he would take adequate measures according to
6 the development of the situation, declined to help
7 us then because there was danger that the disturbances
8 might extend to the Shantung district.

9 "Battles in the Mukden Vicinity

10 "Colonel ITAGAKI, a senior staff officer of
11 the army, was then at Mukden by order of Commander
12 HONJO after the inspection at Liaoyang on the 18th.
13 As he was well aware of the intention of the Commander
14 of the Army as well as the plan of operations, he
15 gave necessary instructions to Colonel HIRATA, the
16 Commander of the 29th Regiment of Infantry and Commander
17 of the Garrison at Mukden, and Lieutenant Colonel
18 SHIMAMOTO, the Commander of the 2d battalion of the
19 Independent Garrison, and agreed with their determina-
20 tion to attack the barracks at Mukden and Peitaiying.
21 The determination of these front-line commanders was
22 reported to Army Headquarters about 2:00 a.m. on the
23 19th, and Commander HONJO gave his assent.

24 "III. ADVANCE OF KWANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS
25 TO MUKDEN POLICY OF LOCALIZATION OF THE INCIDENT,

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REINFORCEMENT FROM THE KOREAN ARMY

"The Commander of the Army, accompanied by the minimum necessary number of men leaving Port Arthur at 3:30 a.m. arrived at Mukden about noon on the 19th, after having issued the first order. Chief of Staff MIYAKE and I remained for some time to arrange some unsettled affairs. Leaving there at 7:25 a.m. we arrived at Mukden past 4 o'clock that afternoon, when we saw columns of smoke rising up somewhere in the direction of Peitaiying, now and then hearing the reports of guns from the direction of Tungtaying far away. On arriving there we were told of the development of the battle. Such swift and successful operations had never been dreamed of.

"The progress of the battle at Changchun had not yet been reported. Although, after my departure from Port Arthur, I had heard on the train of the outbreak of hostilities at Changchun, I did not pay so much attention to it judging from the situation at Mukden. But on my arrival at Mukden, the staff officers there told us that seemingly a fierce battle was going on at Changchun, and the reports of the development of the battle was not so favorable until six o'clock. At last toward the evening we received reports about the occupation of the town of Kuanchengtzu

1 and the barracks at Nanling. This report was delivered
2 to us so late on account of the crippled military
3 communication -- the military communication between
4 Changchun and Mukden had been maintained by radio of
5 the South Manchurian Railway at the time -- due to the
6 sudden increase in telegrams concerning railway traffic
7 caused by the congestion arising from the transporta-
8 tion of troops.

9 "Prior to this, Commander HONJO at 8:40 on the
10 19th received a telegram from the Commander of the
11 Korean Army when he was passing Tashihchiao. It is
12 reported that five infantry battalions, two artillery
13 battalions, one cavalry company and one engineer company
14 together with two squadrons of airplanes were to be
15 dispatched. At the time there were reports of bitter
16 fighting at Changchun and increasing uneasiness in
17 Kirin and Harbin, and ISHIMURA, who was in charge of
18 operations, was deliberating with other staff officers
19 on a plan for the period after the arrival at Mukden.
20 Shortly after 5:00 p.m. on the 19th, information from
21 some quarters of the South Manchurian Railway was
22 received as to the reinforcements from Korea which, it
23 seems, were waiting at Shingishu by orders from above.
24 About 11 o'clock that night we had an official telegram
25 from the Commander of the Korean Army to the same effect.

1 About six that afternoon an instruction by wire from
2 the War Minister, closely followed by a telegram
3 from the Chief of the General Staff, reached us. Their
4 purport was as follows: The instruction from the War
5 Minister:

6 "The present issue between the troops of
7 Japan and China was caused by the attempt on the part
8 of the Chinese troops to blow up the railroad of the
9 South Manchurian Railway, and it is obvious that the
10 blame should be placed upon China, but we have
11 definitely adopted a policy of localizing the affair
12 to a minimum. You will therefore deal with this
13 affair with due consideration of the above.

14 "The instruction from the Chief of the
15 General Staff:

16 "1. The resolution and steps taken by the
17 Commander of the Kwantung Army after September 18 were
18 adequate, and are believed to have been effective in
19 upholding the dignity of our army.

20 "2. It has been decided at a cabinet meeting
21 that in view of the attitude of China since the outset
22 of the affair we should not go farther than necessity
23 drives in measures adopted for the settlement of the
24 issue. Your operations, therefore, will be carried out
25 in accordance with that decision.

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1 "IV. SECOND DIVISION DISPATCHED TO KIRIN,
2 AND KOREAN ARMY REINFORCEMENTS.

3 "From the outset Kirin was the center of
4 the anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria. The report
5 of the clash between the troops of China and Japan
6 caused further aggravation of the anti-Japanese
7 sentiment among the Chinese people near Kirin. On
8 the 19th Hsi Hsia, the Deputy Chief of Kirin
9 Province, declared that he could not take the
10 responsibility thereafter as to the protection of
11 Japanese nationals. According to the information
12 we obtained from the authorities of the Kirin-
13 Changchun Railway, the main force of the Kirin
14 Army had already been called out (its strength and
15 the direction of its movement were not clear.)
16 Toward the evening of the 20th, we were furnished
17 with information by Lieutenant Colonel OSEKO, the
18 Military Adviser to the Kirin Army, to the effect
19 that the Kirin Army had crossed the border on the
20 20th, and we thought that these troops would advance
21 in the direction of Changchun, or come down along
22 the Mukden-Hailung Railway to the south up to
23 Fushun for the purpose of counteracting our move-
24 ment and reinforcing the enemy main force.

25 "At 9:45 that night we received a

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1 telegram (sent at 11:40 p. m. from the President
2 of the Japanese nationals in Kirin. The gist was
3 as follows:

4 "The situation in the Kirin area is tense.
5 The residences of some Japanese nationals have al-
6 ready been fired upon. Therefore, a section of
7 the women and children here has already been
8 evacuated. The remainder, however, not only find
9 evacuation impossible but the danger grows hourly
10 imminent. As a decision on the part of this
11 society we beg you to adopt swift and complete
12 measures to protect this place.'

13 "At the time the situation in the Harbin
14 area was also considerably aggravated. And the
15 Japanese nationals there were preparing to evacuate.
16 In the vicinity of Mukden things were all in a state
17 of confusion, a considerable number of the remnants
18 of the defeated enemy troops being seen prowling
19 thereabout. Under the condition, if troops were
20 to be dispatched to Kirin for the purpose of pro-
21 tecting our nationals there, considering the strength
22 of the enemy force stationed near Kirin it would be
23 necessary to dispatch the complete strength of the
24 2nd Division at Changchun. This, however, would
25 weaken the defense of a long stretch of the railway

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1 line and much danger was apprehended that the
2 remnants of the defeated enemy troops making a
3 rally, might attempt to destroy the railroad, cut
4 our army into two parts and keeping them some
5 four hundred and fifty miles apart, one in the
6 south and the other in the north. But now that the
7 Government had definitely adopted the policy of lo-
8 calizing the affair, the Commander of the Army
9 had to be most deliberate in making decisions.
10 And yet he, who had the heavy responsibility for
11 the protection of our nationals could not find it
12 within himself to leave in imminent danger the
13 nationals whose only hope lay upon that single
14 track of railway. Moreover, a passive measure
15 taken in fear of the danger of separation of
16 strength might prove to be an incentive to the
17 enemy reaction and cause a state of hopeless
18 confusion. At last we reached a conclusion that
19 there was no other way left for us but to deliver
20 such a crushing blow to the enemy at Kirin that it
21 would be thoroughly cowed and, at the same time,
22 to take firm measures for safeguarding the South
23 Manchurian Railway line. Commander HONJO and
24 MIYAKE, the Chief of the Staff, deliberated upon
25 the matter for about an hour, and later again fully

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discussed it with all the staff officers. At 3 a.m.
1 on the 21st a decision to dispatch troops was given
2 by the Commander.

3 "The main force of the Second Division
4 left Changchun for Kirin on the morning of the
5 21st.

6 "According to information from our secret
7 agents, the Kirin Army were taking up positions all
8 around the city of Kirin. We waited for the first
9 report, being prepared for a heavy battle. On
10 account of the defective means of communication,
11 however, we could not make contact with the dis-
12 patched troops until a report of the bloodless
13 occupation of the city reached us after 9 o'clock
14 that evening. Such news was really a surprise -- a
15 pleasant surprise which put our mind at ease. When
16 commander HONJO decided to send troops to Kirin,
17 he reported by wire the details of the dispatch of
18 the troops to the Commander of the Korean Army as
19 well as the military authorities at Tokyo and
20 eagerly waited for the answer, which did not come
21 so soon. Somehow it was felt that the atmosphere
22 in the headquarters of the army was rather gloomy.
23 Shortly after 1 p. m. we obtained information from
24 the authorities of the South Manchurian Railway to
25

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1 the 39th Mixed Brigade had begun
2 River. This report was closely
3 ram from the Brigade Commander,
4 as follows:

5 The 39th Mixed Brigade crossed the
6 River at 1:00 p. m. on the 21st and is coming
7 up to Mukden under Your Excellency's command."

8 "Commander HONJO and all the other members
9 of the Army were grateful for the friendship of the
10 Korean Army in such a difficult situation.

11 "Shortly after this the Chief of the
12 General Staff sent a telegram from Tokyo recogniz-
13 ing that the dispatch to Kirin of our troops was
14 the outcome of necessity.

15 "Upon this Commander HONJO ordered the
16 39th Mixed Brigade to garrison the Mukden area and
17 the whole strength of the Second Division to con-
18 centrate near Changchun.

19 "V. ARMY'S RETURN TO RAILWAY ZONE: BOMB-
20 ING OF CHINCHOW.

21 "As our occupation of Kirin relieved the
22 South Manchurian Railway Zone of its fear of at-
23 tack, Commander HONJO determined to call back the
24 main force of the army immediately to their posts
25 alongside the railway line, and watch the

1 the effect that the 39th Mixed Brigade had begun
2 to cross the Yalu River. This report was closely
3 followed by a telegram from the Brigade Commander,
4 the gist of which was as follows:

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6 frontier at 1:00 p. m. on the 21st and is coming
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25 alongside the railway line, and watch the

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1 development of the situation, taking advantage of
2 the occasion of the arrival of the 39th Mixed
3 Brigade. On September 23 he made a speech to his
4 men, in which he admired their valor and instructed
5 them to maintain complete defense of the zone under
6 strict discipline. On the 24th, the following day,
7 the main force of the Second Division was ordered
8 to guard the vicinity of Changchun, coming back
9 from Kirin, the 39th Mixed Brigade the vicinity of
10 Mukden, and part of the Independent Garrison was
11 stationed at Kirin (the company stationed at Tunghwa
12 left the post on October 10) and near the crossing
13 point of the Liao River east of Hsinmin, and took
14 charge of maintaining peace in the district. Chang
15 Houeh-liang, who was staying at Peiping, established
16 the Headquarters of the Northern Frontier Army and
17 the Government of Mukden Province at Chinchow. High
18 officials, military and civil, including Chang
19 Tso-hsiang, the former Chief of Kirin Province were
20 given their posts. Gradually the Headquarters and
21 the Army was opened. And he attempted to harass
22 our rear inciting mounted brigands and soldier
23 bandits to guerrilla warfare. Not a few Japanese
24 nationals, especially Koreans, were victims of
25 their looting and violence. In spite of the efforts

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1 made by our army uneasiness seemed to prevail
2 wider and wider.

3 "It was natural that the attention of the
4 Kwantung Army should be called to these Chinese
5 machinations at Chinchow.

6 "First, the flying units were ordered to
7 reconnoitre the Chinchow area. According to their
8 reports, our planes appeared above the city of
9 Chinchow, on October 8, when the enemy displayed
10 its hostility firing at the planes, which then
11 bombed the military establishments including the
12 enemy barracks and the College of Communications
13 where the enemy headquarters had been established.
14 But at that time those planes attached to the army
15 had no bombing equipment and were fitted with
16 temporary gear and the bombs were also very crude
17 ones. So we learned the bombing made on that day
18 did not cause any material damage to the enemy.

19 "VI. BATTLE IN THE TAHSING VICINITY
20 SITUATION BEFORE BATTLE.

21 "Since May, 1931, because of the precarious
22 political situation in North China, Wan Fulin, the
23 Chief of Heilungkiang Province and Vice-Commander
24 of the Northern Frontier Army, had been staying
25 at Peiping by order of Chang Hsueh-liang with

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1 three infantry brigades and an artillery corps, the
2 pick of the Heilungkiang Army. Wan Kuopin, his
3 eldest son, remained in his father's place during
4 his absence, and Chief of the Staff Hsieh K'o was
5 in charge of military affairs in place of the Vice-
6 Commander. Faced with a grave situation in Heilun-
7 kiang Province, where signs of drastic change were
8 seen after the outbreak of the incident, Wan Kuopin
9 was too young to have any strong authority over the
10 people, and Hsieh K'o was a mere colonel and not
11 competent enough to decide major important matters,
12 which were all conducted according to the instruc-
13 tions of Wan Fulin who was then at Peiping. More
14 than once Wan Fulin worried about the inconvenience
15 and requested his return to his post of Chang Hsueh-
16 liang, who refused him permission each time. (The
17 above information was obtained through Chinese
18 telegrams which were intercepted and deciphered by
19 us.) Chang Haipeng, the Commander of the Border
20 Garrison of Taonan-Liaosi Districts, seemingly
21 with the intention of expanding his influence
22 towards the north at this opportune time, made a
23 declaration of independence on October 10, and
24 set forth to advance into Heilungkiang Province.
25 Thereupon, Wan Kuopin asked for instructions from

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1 his father on the one hand, while a messenger was
2 sent to Chang Haipeng to appease him. Every time
3 Chang Haipeng's advance was reported to Wan Fulin,
4 he was utterly taken aback and did not know what to
5 do, being either elated or depressed according to
6 the situation. Later on October 4, as it was re-
7 vealed that our army had no intention of helping
8 Chang Haipeng, Wan Fulin sent telegraphic instruc-
9 tions to the following effect:

10 "The Japanese Army will never advance into
11 North Manchuria. Chan Haipeng seeks to take over
12 Heilungkiang Province by threat; so rather than in-
13 dulgung in futile trepidation you should resist him
14 with determination. You will see to it that, as
15 the Japanese Army has no intention of violating
16 North Manchuria, the people should set their minds
17 at ease and be careful not to be deluded by false
18 reports.' (The above was the translation of an
19 intercepted telegraphic instruction sent on Octo-
20 ber 4. The following information of the enemy's
21 movements was also obtained from the enemy's tele-
22 grams intercepted by us. The code-book of the
23 Chinese Army was obtained by us when we entered
24 Mukden.) Then the troops of Heilungkiang Province
25 were concentrated near Tsitsihar, and Ma Chanshan,

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1 the Commander of the 3rd Brigade of Infantry at
2 Heiho was summoned to Tsitsihar and appointed
3 Commander in Chief of the Provincial Army and con-
4 currently Deputy Governor of Heilungkiang Province.

5 "On the other hand Chang Haipeng, although
6 he had designs on Heilungkiang Province, still re-
7 mained irresolute, and was continuing negotiations
8 with the Heilungkiang Provincial Government (accord-
9 ing to the reports from KONO, Chief of the Branch
10 Office of the South Manchurian Railway Company at
11 Taonan), and seemed to be trying to take the area by
12 means of diplomatic tactics. On the part of the
13 Heilungkiang authorities the minds of the leaders
14 were still agitated. Some days went by and it was
15 understood that they were waiting for Ma Chanshan's
16 arrival at Heiho, and at the same time setting
17 forth to fortify the vicinity of Tashing. At last
18 Chang Haipeng made a decision and left Taonan on
19 October 15 (according to the reports from KONO, the
20 Chief of the Branch Office of the Manchurian Railway
21 Company at Taonan and began to march northward.
22 Thereupon, the Heilungkiang Army resisted the
23 aggressing force, burning up a railway bridge across
24 the Nonni River, which caused interruption of
25 traffic on the Taonan-Angangchi Railway line. The

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1 railway was not only part of the main line of
2 international communication but was built on our
3 loan and at the time it was the only security for
4 the loan, as neither principal nor interest had been
5 paid by China. Faced with the season of trans-
6 portation of 2,500,000 tons of special products in
7 North Manchuria, the South Manchurian Railway
8 suffered a serious loss through the destruction
9 of the railway bridge, and economic life of the
10 people in North Manchuria was also considerably
11 affected. Therefore, on October 20 TAKEMURA,
12 Katsukiyo, an engineer of the Taonan-Angangchi
13 Railway Bureau, accompanied by fifteen persons,
14 were sent by the South Manchurian Railway Company
15 to the spot for actual inspection. When TAKEMURA's
16 party arrived there they were illegally fired on at
17 close range by the troops of the Heilungkiang Army
18 who were full aware of their being non-combatants.

20 "After this MURAKAMI, a director of the
21 South Manchurian Railway, together with the consul-
22 general at Mukden made a demand upon the Kwantung
23 Army and the central circles at Tokyo for the re-
24 pairs. Concerning this the army had negotiations
25 with Ma Chanshan through Consul SHIMIZU at Tsitsihar,
and with Kuznetsov, the Vice-President of the Board

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1 of Directors of the East China Railway through
2 the consul-general at Harbin. We made most reason-
3 able representations, but all in vain. It was abso-
4 lutely necessary to complete the repairs before the
5 freeze set in. At the last talks on October 27 we
6 gave them notice that the repairs should be completed
7 by November 3, a week later than that day, and added
8 that if they should not agree with us we must carry
9 out the repairs on our part by using force. The
10 Heilungkiang Government promised to start repairing
11 on October 30, but it was not sincere in its promise,
12 and right from the start no attempt at repairing was
13 made.

14 "NONNI RIVER DETACHMENT DISPATCHED.

15
16 "As no sincerity was shown by the Heilung-
17 kiang Provincial Government the Taouan-Angangchi
18 Railway Bureau and the South Manchurian Railway
19 Company determined to start the repairs and made
20 a request to the army to send troops to protect the
21 working party at the destroyed bridge. It was
22 thought that the main force of the Heilungkiang
23 Army massed on the northern bank of the Nonni
24 River consisted of about 2,000.

25 As the bridge was situated more than 500
kilometers away from the Manchurian Railway Zone

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1 where the main force of our army was stationed,
2 it was quite difficult to send reinforcements
3 at an adequate time in case of emergency. What
4 was worse, the Nonni River ran there isolating
5 from us the working party and the covering force.
6 Under such circumstance, it was obvious that in
7 case of emergency at least one regiment of infantry
8 was absolutely necessary.

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1 But Commander HONJO, honestly observing the local-
2 izing policy, determined to send the necessary mini-
3 mum of men so as not to provoke the people of Heil-
4 ungkiang Province, and ordered the dispatch of the
5 Nonni River Detachment (one infantry battalion, one
6 artillery battalion, and an engineer company) under
7 the command of Colonel HAMAMOTO, the Commander of the
8 16th Infantry Regiment. Commander HONJO gave special
9 instructions to Colonel HAMAMOTO to use prudence
10 and caution in conducting the despatched troops,
11 for instance, first he was to negotiate with Heilung-
12 kiang Army and then send a unit to protect the work-
13 ing party after having ascertained the complete
14 withdrawal of the Heilungkiang Army. He made every
15 effort possible to avoid trouble, to the spot sending
16 ISHIHARA, staff officer in charge of planning
17 military operations. The Nonni River Detachment,
18 starting from Changchun, arrived at the vicinity of
19 Chengchiatuh on November 1 and the next day advanced
20 to the vicinity of Tailai, and then commenced various
21 preparations.
22

23 "On that day Commander HONJO notified Ma
24 Chamshen and Chang Heipeng to the following effect:

25 "As the Taonan-Angangchi Railway Bureau
and the South Manchurian Railway Company are now

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1 going to repair the railway bridge near Nonni
2 River Bridge under cover of our forces;

3 "1. It will not be permitted to use the
4 bridge for military purposes.

5 "2. The troops of both armies should be
6 withdrawn farther than 10 kilometres from the
7 bridge. They are not to be permitted to enter an
8 area within 10 kilometres of the bridge until the
9 completion of the repairs.

10 "From that night until the afternoon of the
11 following day, we received several reports on the
12 progress of the battle. The conditions at the out-
13 set of the battle were reported as follows:

14 "On the night of November 3 our engineer
15 corps repaired the destroyed bridge so that infan-
16 try on foot might be able to cross it. At 3:00
17 a. m. on the 4th Captain HANAI, the Company Commander,
18 and part of his men occupied the 5th Bridge about
19 3 kilometres south of Tahsing Station and took up
20 their posts protecting the working party. At 8:30
21 a. m. the Chief of Staff of the Heilungkiang Army,
22 accompanied by SHIMIZU, the Consul at Tsitsihar,
23 came to the spot and declared that the Heilungkiang
24 Army had no intention of resistance, and promised
25 to withdraw his troops from the first line by noon

1 that day, and returned.

2 "On that morning we had a dense fog which
3 prevented us from ascertaining the enemy's position
4 in front of our troops.

5 "The 7th company of the 18th Infantry
6 Regiment left the 5th Bridge at noon, trusting in
7 the words of the Chief of Staff of the Heilungkiang
8 Army. They marched with a big sunflag at the head
9 of the column and each member carried a small one.
10 When they reached a point some distance to the south
11 of the Tehsing Station, they were suddenly fired on
12 from several directions with rifles and guns. In
13 an instant we had 13 casualties and the company had
14 to retire to the 5th Bridge to wait for the arrival
15 of the main force.

16 "Hearing the reports of guns, the main
17 force then staying near Kiangchiao Station, sudden-
18 ly began to press forward and hostilities began in
19 earnest at dawn on the 5th. The enemy, which had
20 taken up a position and were superior in number to
21 us, made an enveloping attack upon the detachment,
22 which soon found itself in a most difficult situa-
23 tion.
24

25 "Each report which reached us successively
brought unfavorable news of the progress of the battle.

1 "One after another our reinforcements reached
2 the firing line after the daybreak of the 6th. It
3 took them from 25 to 30 hours to reach there. The
4 enemy at first made light of our forces, which were
5 much inferior in number to the enemy, and repeated-
6 ly made heavy attacks upon us. But with the arrival
7 of our reinforcements they were compelled to fall
8 back with heavy losses.

9 "VII. BATTLE NEAR ANGANGCHI

10 "The strength of our Army, massed near
11 Tehsing before November 1, was 5 infantry battalions,
12 5 artillery companies, 1 engineer company, and 2
13 flying companies. It would have been very easy for
14 us to take Tsitsihar, the capital of the province,
15 with these forces. The soldiers in the first line
16 wanted to carry it out, but they were ordered to
17 stand by near Tehsing. The only reason for this was
18 the policy of localization of the affair and peace-
19 ful settlement of the issue.

20 "Our peaceful attitude, however, caused the
21 enemy to make light of our army. Soon some enemy
22 troops were stationed at the Hsi-ohsingtung-Sanchien-
23 fang area, which was situated on the south of the
24 East China Railway Line, and the main force was
25 concentrated near Angangchi. They spread propaganda

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1 that the Japanese forces had been defeated and their
2 attitude was getting more and more arrogant and
3 defiant.

4 "On the other hand, the enemy at Chinchou
5 also gradually assumed activity in cooperation with
6 the Heilungkiang Army. About 10,000 armed bandits
7 instigated by the enemy, crossed the Liao River,
8 threatening to come down to the South Manchurian
9 Railway line.

10 "Ma Chenshan declared that he would have
11 a decisive battle with the Japanese Army. He
12 concentrated about 20,000 troops, including the
13 Heilungkiang Army (T. N. Not Clear) in the area
14 between Tsitsihar and Angangchi before November 10.
15 His cavalry took a position so as to encircle us on
16 the right hand. Thus the movement of the enemy
17 troops became remarkably active. The situation was
18 so keen that hostilities might be opened at any
19 moment by a challenge on the part of the enemy.

20 "The Kwantung Army made a report to the
21 central authorities at Tokyo on the tense situation,
22 and was prepared both for war and peace, gradually
23 concentrating the main force of the Army (mainly
24 including the 2nd Division) near Tahsing.

25 "Even at this time HONJO, the Commander,

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1 did not abandon the idea of peaceful settlement, and
2 he demanded that Ma Chan-shan finally reflect, giving
3 him the following conditions on the 14th:

4 "(a) to withdraw his forces north of the
5 Chinese Eastern Railway and not to send them south
6 of it again.

7 "(b) not to check the traffic of the Taonan-
8 Angengchi Railway.

9 "(c) the Japanese forces will withdraw south
10 of Chengkiatun after ascertaining that the above
11 two conditions are being carried out.

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1 "Ma Chan-shan, however, not only took no
2 notice of those conditions, but also destroyed the
3 Taonan-Angangchi Railway, thus disturbing the
4 Japanese forces in the rear and became more and
5 more challenging.

6 "In such a critical condition the 4th Mixed
7 Brigade and some aid support were coming to us from
8 Japan and they were expected to reach the battlefield
9 about the 22nd. Therefore, we were making prepa-
10 rations to deliver a blow after uniting those forces,
11 but on the 16th and 17th the enemy threatened us
12 in the right rear with numerically superior cavalry and
13 the enemy in front also became more active, so that
14 the 2nd Division confronted them with small strength
15 and occupied Tsitsihar at one blow. Of course our
16 plan was to withdraw our forces as soon as possible
17 if our object was attained; in accordance with that
18 plan we sent no troops into Tsitsihar, stationing
19 our main force at Nantaying and a part at Peitaying
20 and chiefly entrusted China with the preservation of
21 peace. About the 18th it snowed and it was bitterly
22 cold; nevertheless, the heating apparatus was entirely
23 destroyed in the barracks and clothes, etc. had not
24 arrived as yet. Thus the Japanese officers and men
25 had bitter experiences beyond description. The fact

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1 that in this battle no less than 1,000 soldiers were
2 frostbitten among 1,400 who were killed and wounded
3 shows what hardships they underwent.

4 "VIII. THE DESPATCH OF JAPANESE FORCES TO
5 CHINCHOU.

6 "The Chinese forces at and around Chinchou,
7 cooperating with the Ma Chan-shan's forces in the
8 Heilungkiang Province, played an active part about
9 the beginning of November. They advanced a corps
10 to the neighbourhood of Tahushan and Koupangtzu
11 and drove forward a newly organized volunteer force,
12 a detached one, east of the Li River; consequently
13 the disturbance of public peace along the South
14 Manchurian Railway became systematic and large scale.
15 We were exhausted with ceaseless activity as if we
16 were continually driving away summer flies. The
17 conclusion was that so long as we did not capture the
18 base of enemy operations near Chinchow, we would
19 find it difficult to preserve peace in our district.

20 "In the middle of December the positions near
21 Chinchow were made stronger and the Chinese strength which
22 gathered in the vicinity of the city reached 35,000
23 and the number of volunteer bandits, detached forces,
24 incited by the Chinese forces reached from 50,000 to
25 60,000; disturbances plotted east of the Liao River

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1 gave direct threats to the South Manchurian Railway
2 and the bandits along the Antung-Fengtien Railway
3 appeared to be cooperating. The destruction of
4 railroad and stoppages of traffic occurred in rapid
5 succession. Though we adopted the policy of localizing
6 the affair, the situation became so serious that
7 we could not tolerate the Chinese insults any longer,
8 and from the point of view of securing the self-de-
9 fense of the Japanese army and the welfare of the
10 Japanese residents in Manchuria and Mongolia it was
11 a pressing need to capture the base of their opera-
12 tions. The Kwantung Army reported the above situa-
13 tion to the central authorities of the army. The
14 Japanese Government took measures to make the League
15 of Nations have an ample understanding of this situa-
16 tion and reserved the right to suppress the bandits.
17 Then as the bandits in Liaosi were clearly supported
18 by the Chinese regular forces, their suppression made
19 it inevitable that we should have an encounter with
20 the Chinchow force. The Japanese Government, there-
21 fore, issued necessary statements and opened
22 negotiations in Nanking, Peiping and other places
23 demanding the withdrawal of the Chang Hsueh-liang
24 force from the inside of the V. 11. But the latter's
25 activity became such that by permission of the central

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1 authorities of the army the 2nd Division advanced
2 along the Yingkow branch-line starting from the
3 line of the Liao River on December 28th in order
4 to drive away the enemy from the neighbourhood of
5 Tienchuangtai and Panshan which was the strongest
6 base of operations of the volunteer force, a
7 detached one, in Liaosi. Just as we had expected,
8 near Tienchuangtai the Chinese regular forces rein-
9 forced the volunteers with armoured trains and in
10 Panshan the bandits mixed with powerful regular
11 forces made a night attack upon us; in other places
12 we had encounter with such mixed forces. Therefore,
13 HONJO, the Commander, made up his mind and from
14 the 30th on he began to suppress the enemy along the
15 Fengtien-Shanhaikwan Railway, but the enemy unex-
16 pectedly retreated without fighting. The consequence
17 was that Chinchow and district was in a state of
18 anarchy for a while and the peace was disturbed so
19 that the 2nd Division was moved there and the other
20 main force was withdrawn to the South Manchurian
21 Railway.

22 "IX. THE DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO HARBIN

23 "His Hsia, acting-chief of Kirin Province,
24 took the lead of the other provinces in the estab-
25 lishment of a new regime late in September of 1931,

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1 and broke off relations with Chang Hsueh-liang and
2 Chang Tso-hsiang, while the military caste of the
3 Chang Tso-hsiang faction betook themselves to
4 Harbin and its south-eastern vicinity and estab-
5 lished a regime in Pinhsen (about sixty kilometres
6 north-east of Harbin) in opposition to this move.
7 (Hsi Hsia's regime will be called the 'Kirin Regime',
8 the other the 'Anti-Kirin Regime' in the following.)

9 "The Kirin Regime, seeing that there was
10 no way to solve the matter except by force, set
11 about forming new forces, and their strength was
12 computed at nine thousand towards December of that
13 year. Hsi Hsia left the neighbourhood of Kirin on
14 January 5 of the 7th year of Showa (1932), and
15 started on a suppression mission. Pressing the
16 Anti-Kirin forces he reached the suburbs of Harbin,
17 and a battle between the two main forces took place
18 from Jan. 27. About that time some quarters of the
19 Anti-Kirin forces entered Harbin and began to
20 pillage, so the whole city was thrown into an uproar,
21 and the inhabitants filled with alarm. About 5,500
22 Japanese residents (4,000 Japanese and 1,500 Koreans)
23 were there. They urgently demanded that troops be
24 despatched. Though the Kwantung Army also foresaw
25 the aggravation of the situation, it kept observing

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1 the situation impartially and carefully, for it
2 was not desirable to be involved in a conflict be-
3 tween Chinese factions. But it was reported on
4 the night of Jan. 27 that four Japanese had been
5 killed and many Koreans arrested. Furthermore,
6 Captain SHIMIZU, a pilot of a Japanese aeroplane,
7 was murdered by the Anti-Kirin Army when he made
8 a forced landing in the suburbs of Harbin while
9 he was reconnoitering the city on the same day,
10 so that the Army decided to dispatch two infantry
11 battalions in order to protect the residents,
12 having communicated with the central military author-
13 ities and having given both of the two forces notice
14 that there was no intention but that of protecting
15 the Japanese residents."

16 THE PRESIDENT? We will recess for fifteen
17 minutes.

18 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
19 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings
20 were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. BANNO.

4 MR. BANNO: I shall continue to read.

5 "Furthermore it was reported that the Anti-
6 Kilin Army was ill-disposed toward us at that time,
7 so the Kwantung Army feared that unexpected accidents
8 would occur due to the independent advance of small
9 units. And indeed some two thousand Anti-Kilin troops
10 set for Shuangcheng before dawn of January 31, and
11 there broke out a confused fight. At this report
12 also the Kwantung Army was very alarmed, for the four
13 available locomotives were all at Shuangcheng and
14 there was no means of reinforcement. Commander HONJO
15 specially, would have suffered in his mind, because
16 we would not have been able to force, although knowing
17 of its critical situation. For the above mentioned
18 reasons it proved to be dangerous to small units to
19 advance solely, by so the main force of the 2nd Division
20 was added to the two battalions.

21 "Reaching Harbin on February 4, the 2nd
22 Division was challenged by the Anti-Kilin force
23 which had occupied a position near there and was com-
24 pelled to fight back, then entered Harbin on the 5th.

25 "Of course Commander HONJO troubled himself

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1 with the policy of localizing the affair and of
2 withdrawing the 2nd Division promptly to Nanp'u
3 district in order to avoid the occurrence of useless
4 trouble with Soviet Russia, because Harbin heavily
5 involved her rights and interests. But once a severe
6 battle with the Anti-Kilin Army had been fought,
7 unrest could not be dispelled easily, and the division
8 also could not evacuate there immediately."

9 I have only one question to ask -- one
10 supplementary question to ask the witness concerning
11 this affidavit.

12 Q In your affidavit you have testified that
13 on the 18th of September Colonel ITAGAKI gave necessary
14 directions to the garrison commander -- commander
15 of the garrison in Mukden, Colonel HIRATA and Lieutenant
16 Commander -- Second Lieutenant Commander, Second
17 Independent Battalion. Now, what do you mean by the
18 word "directions" as you used it in this affidavit?

19 THE MONITOR: Second Independent Guard
20 Battalion commander, SHIMAMOTO.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Directions means directions;
22 it has no other meaning.

23 Q Then would you explain the functions and
24 duties of staff officers and the Commander of the unit?
25

MR. CARR: I object to that question, your

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1 Honor. This is an attempt to get the witness to
2 explain away a part of his affidavit which happens
3 to be inconvenient in view of what happened this
4 morning.

5 THE PRESIDENT: We do not want the assistance
6 of the witness on that point.

7 MR. BANNO: This concludes direct examination.
8 Prosecution may cross-examine the witness.

9 MR. COMYNS CARR: I have a few questions,
10 your Honor.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

2 Q General TAKEDA, as I understand it, according
3 to you, every advance that was made by the Kwantung
4 Army into Manchuria was against their will. Am I
5 right?

6 A As I understood the question it was said that
7 contrary to the intentions of the Kwantung Army. Am
8 I right?

9 Q You can put it that way if you like.

10 A As I understood the question it was that every
11 advance was taken contrary to the intentions or against
12 the will of the Kwantung Army. There was no such. I
13 should like to inquire of the prosecutor what points
14 in my affidavit referred to portions that the actions
15 were taken against the will or contrary to the inten-
16 tions of the Kwantung Army. What led you to believe
17 that actions that were taken by the Kwantung Army were
18 against its own will?

19 Q Have you not, as you describe each advance
20 in this long affidavit, stated that it was not the
21 intention of the Kwantung Army to advance any further
22 but they were obliged to do so because of something
23 that was done by the Chinese in the locality?

24 A Yes, that is true.
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1 Q Now let me present you with a rather different
2 picture and see what you say about it. You know
3 General DOHIHARA?

4 A Yes, I do.

5 Q Do you know the Japanese Consul General
6 KUWAJIMA in Tientsin?

7 A I have heard of him by name but I haven't
8 met him directly.

9 Q Now just listen to his report on the advances
10 on Chinchou about which you have been telling us, made
11 on the 17th of November 1931. It is prosecution
12 exhibit No. 300. I will just read one passage of it:

13 "For this matter he repelled all intervention
14 and remonstrance; and at times, knowingly that it was
15 against the national policy, he would resort to all
16 sorts of plots under the secret support of influential
17 politicians with determination that it was unavoidable
18 for him to take free activities from the standpoint
19 of the Kwantung Army."

20 MR. BANNO: I object to that. I object on
21 the ground that the question which the prosecutor is
22 putting to the witness now is outside the scope of
23 the direct examination and also irrelevant.

24 THE PRESIDENT: It is well within the scope.
25 The objection is overruled.

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Q (Continuing) He goes on: "And without regard
1 to means, he finally caused a riot to occur on the 8th,
2 but when he saw that it ended in a failure due to mis-
3 carriage of the plan, he took the opportunity of the
4 riot throughout the city and carried out resolutely
5 the Emperor's passage to Manchuria." And a little
6 further on in the same report Consul General KUWAJIMA
7 says with regard to a Chinaman by the name of Li Chi
8 Chun: "He (that is, DOHIHARA) supplied them with
9 50,000 taels as working funds, and using two or three
10 men of the garrison troops, let them secretly provide
11 Li with armaments sent by the Kwantung Army."

Now, isn't the fact that in each case where
13 you say that the Kwantung Army intervened because
14 there were rival armies fighting one another one or
15 other of those armies was being financed and supplied
16 with arms by the Kwantung Army through DOHIHARA?

A These matters have to do with matters which
18 are outside the scope of my knowledge, having occurred
19 in Tientsin. Therefore, I know nothing of them.

Q Then let me give you an example, a case you
21 speak of in your affidavit on page 17. You say --
22 middle of page 17, English translation: "Chang
23 Haipeng, the Commander of the Border Garrison to Taonan-
24 Liaosi Districts, seemingly with the intention of
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1 expanding his influence toward the north at this
2 opportune time, made a declaration of independence on
3 October 10, and set forth to advance into Heilungkiang
4 Province." Now, do you know Mr. HAYASHI, Consul
5 General at Mukden?

6 A Yes, I do.

7 Q You do. Do you know that on the 13th of
8 October, that is three days after the day you name,
9 he reported to the Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA in
10 Tokyo: "Chang Haipeng received 5,000 rifles and
11 \$200,000 from the Japanese in support of this declar-
12 ation of independence"?

13 MR. BANNO: I should like to know the number
14 of the document being referred to by the prosecutor
15 as the telegram sent by Consul General HAYASHI.

16 MR. COMYNS CARR: This document has not yet
17 been exhibited because we didn't know this witness
18 was going to give evidence about Chang Haipeng, but
19 its document number is 1767.

20 A As far as I know I believe that no such thing
21 occurred. I assume that Consul General HAYASHI's
22 telegram is very emotional and had a tendency to make
23 exaggerations.

24 Q You think there were only 4,000 rifles?

25 A No, I am not referring to numbers. I believe

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1 that the Kwantung Army would not adopt such a measure.

2 Q Well, then, you don't mean it is an exaggera-
3 tion. You mean it is a lie, do you?

4 A I don't mean to say definitely that it is a
5 lie, but as far as I know I don't think that such a
6 thing happened.

7 Q Now, Consul General HAYASHI goes on to say:
8 "The same Chang Haipeng receiving the Japanese aid
9 did increase his troops from 3,000 to 5,000 and marched
10 on Tsitsihar in northern Manchuria. He was also
11 prepared to support Pu-Yi's restoration." What do
12 you say to that?

13 A As I said before, this Chang Haipeng, the
14 independence proclamation that he made, I believe that
15 it was something done by himself personally from his
16 own standpoint.

17 Q Done by whom? DOHIHARA?

18 A As far as I know no member of the Kwantung
19 Army was connected with this independence proclamation.

20 MR. MATTICE: If your Honor please.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mattice.

22 MR. MATTICE: May I interpose an objection
23 here to the practice of counsel which amounts to giving
24 evidence? He is reading from a document which, as I
25 understand it, is not in evidence. It ought not to

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1 be read from even in the way of a basis for a ques-
2 tion. It seems to me it is improper and I object to
3 it for that reason.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, I understand
6 that the document has not yet been made an exhibit
7 but in view of this evidence it will, in due course,
8 be tendered and I am giving the witness the opportunity
9 of dealing with it.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: That raises a big question,
2 whether you can tender any further evidence except
3 a document admitted by a witness on cross-examination.
4 We have no opinion one way or the other on that, Mr.
5 Carr; but, would you care to have that point argued
6 now?

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: If your Honor pleases,
8 I am quite prepared to.

9 Your Honor, in our submission, the right
10 of the prosecution to tender evidence in a proper
11 case in rebuttal is an elementary right which does
12 not need specifically stating in a document such as
13 the Charter of this Tribunal. The Charter does not
14 purport to set out a complete code of procedure but
15 only to deal with matters where it is intended that
16 the course of procedure normal in the tribunals of
17 most countries shall be departed from.

18 For instance, there is no reference in the
19 Charter to the right of the accused to submit motions
20 to dismiss the case at the end of the case for the
21 prosecution. Nevertheless, there being nothing to
22 the contrary, the Tribunal, following normal proce-
23 dure, allowed it to be done. In the same way, I can
24 find nothing in the Charter indicating that evidence
25 in rebuttal is excluded; and, therefore, in my sub-

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1 mission, it is a matter of normal procedure which is
2 not mentioned because the framers of the Charter did
3 not desire to introduce any special or abnormal pro-
4 cedure on that point, and, in my submission, it is
5 unmentioned for no other reason.

6 The only words in the Charter which, in my
7 submission, have any bearing on the question are the
8 well known words in Article 13a that "the Tribunal
9 shall adopt and apply to the greatest extent expedi-
10 tious and non-technical procedure." It would, in
11 my submission, be highly technical if the Tribunal
12 were precluded from taking into consideration evi-
13 dence which was not given by the prosecution in the
14 first instance either because it was not at that time
15 discovered or because the prosecution did not attach
16 any importance to the matter until it was brought
17 up by the defense. The latter, I think, is the
18 reason why this particular document was not intro-
19 duced in the first place.

20 That is all I desire to say on the point
21 about rebuttal, your Honor.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Warren.

23 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, at
24 this time the objection lodged goes to questioning
25 a witness concerning a document which is not in

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1 evidence.

2 THE PRESIDENT: You can always cross-examine
3 on evidence that you propose to give, if you can
4 give it. The only question is whether this evidence
5 that the prosecution intend to give can be given. If
6 it is excluded, it must be by Article 15 of the
7 Charter which does not advert to the point. Article
8 15 says, "The prosecution or the defense may offer
9 evidence," but it does not say the prosecution must
10 offer all their evidence at the same time before the
11 defense offers any.

12 MR. WARREN: Your Honor, it appears to me
13 that there will be more than just those questions
14 raised. Of course, there is the scope of the cross-
15 examination, which we have been limited to, within
16 the confines of the affidavit of the witness. I
17 have never understood a rule of evidence which would
18 permit the cross-examination of a witness on a docu-
19 ment the relevancy and competency of which have not
20 first been determined.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Do not commit yourself to
22 that statement, Colonel Warren. It would mean that
23 the defendant, in the course of the prosecution's
24 case, could never cross-examine on the document the
25 defense propose to use. It might be done by the

1 defense with a view to obviating the need to call
2 evidence. It is frequently done in British courts
3 and, I am sure, in America.

4 MR. WARREN: There does seem to be some
5 difference, your Honor, in the ruling, perhaps. How-
6 ever, I am not familiar with the British rule on
7 that. Ordinarily, if a witness is to be examined
8 on a document, the document is first given to the
9 witness, and he identifies it. He states as to
10 whether he has or has not seen it and knows what it
11 is and its contents.

12 THE PRESIDENT: The main purpose of a cross-
13 examination is to put to the opposing witness your
14 evidence to see whether he accepts or rejects it.

15 MR. WARREN: There does seem to be some
16 difference, your Honor. Whether it is a real,
17 material difference, that I am not competent to say
18 at this time. Ordinarily, we will present the witness
19 with the document; and, if he is familiar with it,
20 then we will proceed to cross-examine upon it.

21 THE PRESIDENT: I have said nothing to the
22 contrary. You say you cross-examine only on the
23 document the Court has admitted, and that is not
24 correct.

25 MR. WARREN: Perhaps the Court misunderstands

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1 me. What I am referring to is cross-examination
2 upon facts which are not in evidence, upon pre-
3 sumptive facts that they intend to introduce at a
4 later time.
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1 THE PRESIDENT: You can put to the appropri-
2 ate witness facts which you intend to adduce, to
3 see whether he accepts them or denies them. Not
4 only can you do it, but you are expected to do it.
5 Otherwise you leave yourself open to the charge of
6 unfairness.

7 MR. WARREN: Quite, your Honor, but a
8 witness may not be impeached on a collateral issue.
9 Cross-examination is for the purpose of impeachment
10 generally of the witness. Until the witness has
11 first stated he is familiar with the document from
12 which counsel is speaking, there could be no im-
13 peachment -- if he knew nothing about it.

14 THE PRESIDENT: You are jumping from facts
15 to other testimony -- from documents to other
16 testimony -- from other testimony to documents.

17 Now let us deal with them separately.
18 Take a document. The witness can not be confronted
19 with a document unless he acknowledges its existence.
20 Once he does he can be cross-examined about it.

21 Take other testimony. That can be put to
22 the witness to see whether he accepts it or rejects
23 it.

24 If you don't put your case to him you are
25 open to the charge of unfairness, if he testifies

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1 about the same matters, as this witness is.

2 MR. WARREN: I now understand, your Honor.
3 I am sorry. I mis-interpreted the Court's remark.
4 I think we have been in accord all along.

5 THE PRESIDENT: But now what we are dis-
6 cussing is the meaning of Article 15 of the Charter,
7 the meaning and effect.

8 Apparently the defense do not contest that
9 you are entitled to give evidence in rebuttal.

10 MR. COMYNS CARR: I don't know if the Court
11 proposes to rule on that now.

12 THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't rule on that
13 without consulting all the Members of the Court. I
14 know what my own view is, but I don't know the
15 views of the other Members of the Court.

16 We are of the opinion that evidence may
17 be given in rebuttal by the prosecution.

18 MR. COMYNS CARR: Then, your Honor, I will
19 ask the witness to answer my original question,
20 which he had better be reminded of.

21 CROSS-EXAMINATION

22 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

23 Q Is it true that Chang Hai-peng, receiving
24 Japanese aid, increased his troops from 3,000 to
25

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1 5,000, to march on Tsitsihar, in northern Manchuria?

2 A The question that this Chang Hai-peng
3 received Japanese aid, I believe this is not true.
4 But the fact that the strength of the troops were
5 increased is true, and it is also true that they
6 marched northward.

7 Q Is it also true, again I suggest because
8 of Japanese aid that he had received, that he
9 announced himself as being ready to support Pu-Yi's
10 restoration?

11 A This also is outside the scope of my
12 knowledge, but I have heard to the effect that he
13 had voluntarily risen to aid this movement to
14 restore Pu-Yi.

15 Q Do you know another HYASHI, a Major HYASHI,
16 who was in Manchuria at this time?

17 A Yes, I do.

18 Q Did he, on the 6th of November 1931,
19 demand of the Heilunkiang government that General
20 Ma Chan-shan should resign and Chang Hai-peng should
21 be appointed governor in his place?

22 K I am not informed of what Major HYASHI had
23 done.

24 Q Did General HONJO, on November 11, demand
25 by telegram General Ma Chan-shan's resignation?

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1 A This also is outside the scope of my
2 knowledge. In view of the fact that I was an opera-
3 tional officer, matters of such nature were duties
4 to be settled by the liaison officers; therefore, I
5 am not informed of this matter.

6 Q I am not surprised, but if that is the
7 case how is it that throughout your affidavit you
8 profess to be able to tell us not only telegrams
9 sent to and received by -- sent and received by
10 General HONJO, but also what was in his mind at
11 various times? How'd you know that?

12 A Of course, it is needless to say that
13 General HONJO was very desirous of reaching a
14 peaceful settlement and that he did not desire by
15 any means the dispatch of troops to north Manchuria,
16 and I know that it was his policy.

17 Q Well, if it is needless to say it and also
18 you don't know anything about it, why do you say it?

19 A Matters of this nature were not fully known
20 by those in charge of operations.

21 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half-
22 past nine tomorrow morning.

23 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjourn-
24 ment was taken until Friday, 4 April 1947,
25 at 0930.)

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